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ADVANCEMENTS: I*

Harold I. Elbertt
I
INTRODUCTION"

legislation varies in most states. Even the most
frequently used definition of advancements is inadequate because
the doctrine is of purely statutory origin and its effect as a legal doctrine
must be determined from the legislation of each state. A typical definition specifies, in part, that an advancement is "... the giving by the
intestate in his lifetime, by anticipation, the whole or part of what it is
supposed the donee will be entitled to on the death of the party making
it."2 Neither this definition nor any other can precisely explain the
meaning of the term.
In most states the intent of the advancor determines whether a
voluntary inter vivos transfer of property is an advancement and the
intent of the advancee is regarded as immaterial. In both Kentucky and
South Carolina the intent of both the advancor and the advancee is
immaterial and all substantial voluntary inter vivos transfers are
advancements.
Since evidence of the advancor's intent is often lacking, the courts,
of necessity, have worked out a series of presumptions which serve as a
basis for determining the transferor's intent.
In some states the doctrine applies to cases of partial intestacy.
However, in most states the advancor must die totally intestate. Many
states require advancements to be charged in writing. Most states have
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1 The only treatise on the doctrine was published in 1893 by W.W. Thornton under
the title of "Gifts and Advancements." That book was primarily a study of the law of gifts.
However, the author believed that the advancement concept was so closely linked to a
study of gifts that he included it in his book.
2 Grattan v. Grattan, 18 Ill •. (8 Peck.) 167 (1856).
3 The decided cases customarily refer to the person making an advancement as the
donor and the recipient of the advancement as the donee. CE. Grattan v. Grattan, supra
note 2. To illustrate the distinction between the recipient of a gift and the recipient of an
advancement, the authors of the Model Probate Code used the word "advancee." Model
Probate Code §29; SIMl!s AND BASYE, PRoBLBMS IN PRoBA'l'B LAw 65 (1946). That word
was adopted by the recent Pennsylvania advancement statute. Pa. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1949)
tit. 20, §1.9.
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no such requirement. All statutes specify the persons to whom the
doctrine is applicable but they vary as to the persons included in the
doctrine.
Other problems presented include determination of the value of
advancements, methods by which they are to be accounted for, and
whether or not they bear interest in given situations.
The purpose of this monograph is to consider the afore-mentioned
topics and other questions inherent in the doctrine of advancements.
Different interpretations in the various states will be discussed. The
principal objectives of the work are to make a comparative study of
advancement legislation and to state the law as it actually exists as a
basis for determining whether it can he improved.

II
HISTORY OF .fu>VANCEMENTS

To understand the law of" advancements or any other legal rule or
principle, a study of its history and development is helpful. Unfortunately, after a diligent search and inquiry, the writer has been unable
to locate the source of the advancement provision in the English statute
of distributions. Since it has been impossible to ascertain authoritatively the precise origin of advancements, it is advisable to discuss the
material which at least sheds some light on its history and is indicative
of its development.
William Blackstone aptly describes the possible sources of advancements in the following language:
"This just and equitable provision hath been also said to he
derived from the collatio bonorum [commingling of property for
the purpose of equal division] of the imperial law: which it certainly resembles in some points though it differs widely in others.
But it may not be amiss to observe that, with regard to goods and
chattels, this is part of the ancient custom of London, of the
province of York, and our sister kingdom of Scotland: and with
regard to lands descending in coparcenary; that it hath always
been, and still is, the common law of England, under the name
of hotchpot."4
To obtain an understanding of advancements, it is advisable to
start with the doctrine of Roman law known as collatio bonorum.
Under this doctrine, as a means of justice, the praetor allowed an
42 BLACKST. CoMM.

•517.
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emancipated son and a daughter who had received a dowry to claim a
child's share in the estate of their father. Before they were entitled to
participate, the emancipated son had to account for all property he had
accumulated and the daughter had to account for the amount of her
dowry. However, they were not expected to account to their father's
estate if they would not benefit by doing so.6
The basis for this rule was that an unemancipated child had to turn
over all of his earnings to his father, thereby increasing the value of
the latter's estate. However, an emancipated child was entitled to keep
all he eamed0 and the daughter's dowry diminished the father's estate. 7
Therefore, the purpose of the doctrine was to make the inheritance of
the children equal.
When the filiifamilias became capable of holding property of their
own the old form of collatio disappeared. Accordingly, the scope of
the rules of collatio as they appear in the later imperial legislation (from
the Emperor Leo, A. D. 472, onward) was different from the older
rules. 8 Collatio dotis, which was required of a daughter who had
received a dowry, was the basis of two new ideas: (I) the person
making collatio must be in the family and (2) the fund out of which
it was made came from the father. These two ideas were the basis of
a new form of collatio.9
The object of the new form of collatio was to compel children to
account for benefits from their father before they were entitled to a
child's share in his estate. The sole exception to this rule was that the
child need not account if the father intended to grant an extra portion
to him.10 The benefits included a dos, in the case of the daughter; a
donatio propter nuptias, in the case of the son;11 and in the case of
11 BuCXLAND, A MANuAL Ol' PmvATB RoMAN I.Aw, 2d ed., 198 (1939); BuCXLAND,
A TEXTBOOK ol' RoMAN I.Aw, 2d ed., 325 (1932); RADIN, RoMAN I.Aw 465 (1927).
6 BuCXLAND, A MANuAL Ol' PmvATB RoMAN I.Aw, 2d ed., (1939); HUNTER, RoMAN
I.Aw 849 (1855); LEDLIE, SoHM's lNsnnrms ol' RoMAN I.Aw, 3d ed., 564 (1907); I.En,
THE ELEMENTS Ol' RoMAN I.Aw 255 (1944); RADIN, RoMAN I.Aw 464, 465 (1927); 2
SHERMAN, RoMAN I.Aw IN THE MODERN WoRLD, 3d ed., 245 (1907).
7 BuCXLAND, A TEXTBOOK oF RoMAN I.Aw, 2d ed., 325 (1932); LEDLIE, SoHM's
lNsnTUTEs OF RoMAN I.Aw, 3d ed., 564, 565 (1907).
SLEDLIE, SoHM's fusxnurns OF RoMAN I.Aw, 3d ed., 565 (1907).
1l BuCXLAND, A MANuAL ol' PmvATB RoMAN I.Aw, 2d ed., 198 (1939); BuCXLAND,
A TEXTBOOK OF RoMAN I.Aw, 2d ed., 366 (1932); LEDLIE, SoHM's lNsnTtJTEs Ol' RoMAN
I.Aw, 3d ed., 565 (1907); RADIN, RoMAN I.Aw 465 (1927).
10 LEDLIE, SoHM's lNsnTUTEs ol' RoMAN I.Aw, 3d ed., 565 (1907); RADm, RoMAN
I.Aw 466 (1927).
llBLAcx:'s I.Aw TucnoNARY, 3d ed., 613 (1933): "Dowry; A wife's marriage portion; all that property which on marriage is transferred by the wife herself or by another
to the husband with a view of diminishing the burden which the marriage will entail upon
him." Id., p. 612: "A gift on account of marriage. In Roman law, the bridegroom's gift
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either, aid given to set them up in life.12 The object of these new rules
of collatio was to insure that, as between several joint descendants, the
estate be distributed in such a way as to redress any inequality because
of the benefits previously bestowed on them by the deceased.13 Until
the time of Justinian this new form of collatio was applied only in cases
of intestacy, but in a novel he extended it to include testate estates, so
that a legatee could not claim a bequest without bringing in previous
benefits.14
In Roman law, forced heirship is an institution similar to collatio.
It applied only where a parent died testate.15 By that doctrine, a child
who was not expressly disinherited by his parent's will was entitled to
claim a share in his estate. If the child was given a legacy which was
less than he would have inherited if his father had died intestate, he
was entitled to claim up to one-fourth of that share. The basis of the
institution of forced heirship was the natural affection a parent had
for his children and the fact that they often helped him accumulate his
estate.18
to the bride in anticipation of mamage and to secure her dos was called 'donatio ante
nuptias' but by an ordinance of Justinian such gift might be made after as well as before
mamage, and in that case it was called 'donatio propter nuptias.'"
12 BuCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF RoMAN LAw, 2d ed., 366 (1932).
13 BucKLAND, A MANuAL oF PRIVATB RoMAN LAw, 2d ed., 226 (1939); BuCKLAND,
A TEXTBOOK OF RoMAN LAw, 2d ed., 366 (1932); LEDLIE, Som.t's lNSTITtlTlls OF
RoMAN LAw, 3d ed., 565 (1907).
14 BuCKLAND, A MANuAL OF PRIVATB RoMAN LAw, 2d ed., 198 (1939); BuCKLAND,
A TEXTBOOK oF RoMAN LAw, 2d ed., 327 (1932); HUNTER, RoMAN LAw 849 (1885).
15 BuCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF RoMAN LAW, 2d ed., 327 (1932); HONTBn, RoMAN
LAw 780 (1885): "Evidently this principle of Roman law must be traced to the same
origin as the rule requiring express disherison. It follows from the community of interest
that the children had with the father in the family property. That property was gathered
by their help as well as his (for by the potestas the father became the owner of all that
accrued to or was gained by his son), and it would be extremely harsh to allow him to
bequeath the whole of his property to strangers.'' Lm!, ELBMENTS OF RoMAN LAw 211,
212 (1944): "Since it often happened that parents unreasonably disinherited or passed
over their children a rule was introduced allowing children who complain that they have
been unjustly disinherited or unjustly passed over to bring the plaint of the unduteous
will on the pretended ground that the parents were in a way insane when they made
their will. It is not alleged that the testator was really insane (if he had been there would
have been no will at all); the supposition is that the testator has made his will validly,
but not in accordance with the claims of natural affection. • • •
"All this must be understood to apply only if the testator had left nothing at all by
his will. This has been enacted by our constitution out of regard for the claims of nature.
IE they have been left any share of the inheritance great or small, or anything whatever,
the querela cannot be brought, but the aggrieved party may have what he takes under the
will brought up to a fourth part of what he would take in the event of an intestacy,
although there is no direction to this effect in the will. • • ." CE. Dainow, "The Early
Sources of Forced Heirship, Its History in Texas and Louisiana," 4 LA. L. Rnv. 42 (1941).
l8 BuCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF RoMAN LAw, 2d ed., 326 (1932); HONTBn, RoMAN
LAw 780 (1885); LBDLm, SoHM's lNsT.ITUTBs oF RoMAN LAw, 3d ed., 553 (1907); LBB,
THB ELBMENTS OF RoMAN LAw 207 (1944); RADIN, RoMAN LAw 441 (1927).
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Forced heirship in the Roman law is the basis of legitim in the civil
law countries. It is, to some extent, recognized by England in the Family Provision Act of 1938.17 Under that act the court can enter an
order for support and maintenance out of a testator's estate, if his or her
will does not make reasonable provision for the following persons: a
wife or husband, a daughter who has not been married, a son or daughter who is incapable of maintaining himself or herself by reason of some
mental or physical disability, or an infant son. In order to compare the
doctrines of collation and legitim, a study of the Louisiana statutes,
which recognize both of these doctrines, is helpful.
Suppose that an intestate leaves a net estate of $1,000, to be distributed among his children, X and Y. In his lifetime he gave X
$1,500, and at the time of the transaction acknowledged that it was
intended as an extra portion. The collation statutes do not require X
to account for the $1,500, because his father had formally acknowledged that it was given as an advantage or extra portion.
The legitim statutes provide that donations inter vivas or mortis
causa cannot exceed one-half of the property of the disposer, if he
and 2 Geo. VI, c. 45. That statute reads in part as follows:
"Where, after the commencement of this Act, a person dies domiciled in England
leaving(a) a wife or husband;
(b) a daughter who had not been married, or who is, by reason of some mental or
physical disability, incapable of maintaining herself;
(c) an infant son; or
(d) a son who is, by reason of some mental or physical disability, incapable of maintaining himself; and leaving a will, then, if the court on application by or on behalf of any
such wife, husband, daughter or son as aforesaid (in this Act referred to as a 'dependant' of
the testator) is of the opinion that the will does not make reasonable provision for the
maintenance of that dependant, the court may order that such reasonable provision as the
court thinks fit shall, subject to such conditions or restrictions, if any, as the court may
impose, be made out of the testator's net estate for the maintenance of that dependant:
"Provided that no application shall be made to the court by or on behalf of any person
in any case where the testator has bequeathed not less than two-thirds of the income of the
net estate to a surviving spouse and the only other dependant or dependants, if any, is or
are a child or children of the surviving spouse." Dainow, "The Early Sources of Forced
Heirship, Its History in Texas and Louisiana," 4 LA. L. REv. 42 (1941). The writer
discusses the history of forced heirship in Louisiana, Spain, Germany and Texas with reference to its historical background. In addition, the rejection of forced heirship in Texas
is discussed in great detail. In regard to the disapproval of this part of the civil law in
Texas the following quotation from the article, at p. 57, is interesting:
"Why forced heirship disappeared while the civil law institution of community property remained cannot be answered with certainty. However, it would appear that whereas
the active part played by the wife of the pioneer was certainly in keeping with the concept
of the acquisitions becoming community propertY, the individualistic spirit of a pioneer
country was not in sympathy with restrictions on the rights of ownership." Dainow, "Forced
Heirship in French Law," 2 LA. L. REv. 669 (1940); Dainow, "Limitations on Testamentary Freedom in England," 25 CoRN. L.Q. 337 (1940) (a thorough discussion of the history of the English statute); Dainow, "Restricted Testation in New Zealand, Australia
and Canada," 36 MICH. L. REv. 1107 (1938).
171
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leaves at his decease two children. The legitim is ascertained by adding the amount of the dispositions of the decedent, in his lifetime, to
the value of his estate at his death and by deducting therefrom debts
and expenses of administration. Therefore, for the purpose of determining what the decedent could dispose of in his lifetime, the estate
consists of $2,500, the $1,500 gift to X and the $1,000 in the estate.
Since18 his father could give away only $1,250, X must account for
$250.
An answer to the question whether the Roman law is the source
of the advancement provision in the statute of distributions is but an
inference from the available facts. English cases involving disputes
as to the line of succession of an intestate's property, decided shortly
after the enactment of the statute, state that it was written by Sir
Walter Walker, an eminent civilian.19 In Pett 11. Pett,20 the English
court stated that Sir Walter Walker failed to prevail in a case involving
rights of succession to an intestate's property, and that he had an act of
Parliament passed to accomplish the result he desired.
In England, prior to the enactment of the statute of distributions,
an administrator of the estate of a deceased person could not be compelled to make distribution of the residue of the intestate's effects.
After paying the intestate's debts and funeral expenses, the administrator would keep the balance of the estate. The ecclesiastical court, in
an effort to stop that practice, would take bonds from the administrator
to make distribution. However, the temporal courts held that these
bonds were void and that the ecclesiastical court could not oblige an
administrator to make distribution.21
To put an end to the controversy between the spiritual and temporal courts, the statute of distributions was enacted. The church,
which was responsible for the enactment of this legislation, was undoubtedly familiar with Roman Law. Also, the degrees of kinship
set forth in the statute are almost identical with the 118th novel of
18 La. Civ. Code Ann. (1945) arts. 1227 to 1232; La. Civ. Code Ann. (1945) arts.
1493 to 1498; see also, Dainow, ''The Early Sources of Forced Heirship, Its History in
Texas and Louisiana," 4 LA. L. REv. 42 (1941).
19Rex v. Raines or Pett v. Pett, 1 Ld. Raym. 571, 91 Eng. Rep. 1281 (1701); Cf.
Carter v. Crowley, Raym. Sir T. 496, 83 Eng. Rep. 259 (1681) (in this case the court
conferred with civilians as to the interpretation of the statute).
20Rex v. Raines or Pett v. Pett, 1 Ld. Raym. 571, 91 Eng. Rep. 1281 (1701).
21 Hughes v. Hughes, 1 Lev. 233, 83 Eng. Rep. 384 (1680); Edwards v. Freeman,
2 P. Wms. 435, 24 Eng. Rep. 802 (1727); cf. Boyd v. Boyd, L.R. 4 Eq. 305 (1867) (in
that case the court pointed out that the statute of distn'butions is based on the custom of
London, which is derived from Roman law).
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Justinian. 22 It is, therefore, reasonable to infer that the advancement
provision of the statute of distributions is based on Roman Law. This
inference will be strengthened when we have completed the study of
other possible sources of the doctrine.
Since many cases state that the advancement provision of the statute
of distributions was based on the customs of London and York, a study
of these customs may shed some light on its history. To be familiar
with these customs, it is advisable to begin with the early common law
rule that established a compulsory portion. It provided that a man
could dispose of only a third part of his goods if he were survived by a
wife and child.23 If he violated this law, the aggrieved party could sue
out the writ de rationahile parte honorum. There is some dispute
among legal writers as to whether it was necessary to allege a special
custom in order to succeed with this writ. 24 Some writers state that it
was a common law rule that fell into disuse throughout most of England but that in some localities it was retained as a special custom.25
One writer states that in early times this rule applied to all parts of
England except London. 26 This statement is very doubtful. London
was the city where the custom was strongest, and the statute of distributions provided that it should not prejudice or hinder the customs
observed within the city of London.27
22 22 and 23 Charles II, c. 10; SIMBs, CASES ON TnusTS AND SucCEssxoN 9 (1942).
The author has a translation of the first thxee chapters of the 118th novel of Justinian.
23 3 Con's FmsT lNsnTUT.l!s "316 et seq.; SWINBURNE, TESTAMENTS AND LAST
WILLS, 7th ed., 230 (1793); 2 PoLLOCK AND MArrLAND, HISTORY oF ENGusH 1..Aw, 2d
ed., 348 et seq. (1923) (An exceptionally good discussion of the concept of legitim in
England. The writers discuss its possible origin and why there are not many cases on the
principle); Dainow, ''Limitations on Testamentary Freedom in England," 25 CoRN. L.Q.
337 (1940).
24 PoLI.ING, I..Aws oF LONDON, 2d ed., 181 (1854); Con's FmsT INSTITUTES "316
et seq.; 2 PoLLoCK AND MArrr.AND, HISTORY oF ENGuSH I..Aw, 2d ed., 351 (1923);
Dainow, ''Limitations on Testamentary Freedom in England," 25 CoRN. L.Q. 337 (1940).
2 5 Ibid.
2 0 2 PoLLOCK. AND MAinAND, HISTORY oF ENGusa 1..Aw, 2d ed., 350 (1923);
BRACTON f. 60 b. 61.
27 BROWN, Pmvll.EGIA LoNDINI 155 (1702); JACOBS, CITY WBRTIES OR THE RIGHTS
AND Pmvll.EGBs OF FRBBMBN 75 (1732); POLI.ING, I..Aws OF LoNDON, 2d ed., 181 (1854);
22 and 23 Charles II, c. 10 (1670). That statute reads in part as follows: " ••• That
this act, or anything herein contained, shall not any ways prejudice or hinder the customs
observed within the city of London or within the province of York, or other places having
known and received customs peculiar to them, but that the same customs may be observed
as formerly; anything herein contained to the contrary notwithstanding." Abolition of the
custom for the province of York, 4 William and Mary, c. 2 (1692) and 2 and 3, Ann, c. 5
(1703); For London, 11 George 1, c. 18 (1724); For Wales, 7 and 8; William 3, c. 38
(1696); Con's FmST INSTITUTES "318.
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The customs of London and York had a doctrine of advancements.

It was not like the concept as we know it today. For instance, in London28 an advancement to a child in his parent's lifetime was a bar to
further participation in the estate, unless the parent acknowledged in
writing that the child had not received his full share. If the parent did
not execute such an instrument, the child was barred from further participation in the estate even though he agreed to account for the full
amount received by him. The basis for the rule was the difficulty in
determining the exact amount to be accounted for. 29
There is one striking similarity between the custom and the statute
of distributions. Under both, a widow is not permitted to compel children to account for advancements.so The difference between the two
is that the advancement provision in the statute of distributions was
designed to produce equality among the children of an intestate whereas the custom did not. It was an outgrowth of an old system of common law81 that had fallen into disuse everywhere except in a few localities.s2 The custom of York was similar to the custom of London.ss
2s Civil v. Rich, 1 Vern. 216, 23 Eng. Rep. 423 (1683); Fouke v. Lewin, 1 Vern. 88,
23 Eng. Rep. 331 (1682); Chace v. Box, 1 Ld. Raym. 484, 91 Eng. Rep. 1223; Hall v.
Hall, 2 Vern. 277, 23 Eng. Rep. 779 (1692). In that case the wife was claiming that a
gift to the children was a fraud on the custom. Held, if a person parts with the
entire title to peISonalty in his lifetime he can avoid the custom. Turner v. Jennings, 2
Vern. 612, 23 Eng. Rep. 1000 (1708). In that case a freeman gave property to children
of a deceased son reserving in himself a life interest. Held, such a gift was in fraud
of the custom. However, if he had parted with all right, title and interest in the property
in his lifetime he could have avoided the custom. CoKll's FmsT lNsnTOTEs *318 (1818);
JACOBS, CITY LrnBRTil!S OR THB RrGHTS AND PRlVILBGBS OF FRBBMBN 75 (I 732); BROWN,
PRIVILEGE LONDINI 155 (1702).
29Rowe v. Rowe, 144 Va. 816, 130 S.E. 771 (1925); Stanton v. Platt, 2 Vern. 753,
23 Eng. Rep. 1092 (I 717).
so The advancement provision under the custom of London operated so as to allow
a freeman of that city to make an advancement to a child and thereby deprive the child
from claiming his orphanage share. Civil v. Rich, supra note 28; Chace v. Box, supra
· note 28. The custom of London applied only to peISonalty whereas the advancement
provision in the statute of distributions coveIS advancements in real property made to
children other than the heir at law. 22 and 23 Charles II, c. 10; Stanton v. Platt, supra
note 29.
31 Kemps v. Kelsey, Pree. Ch. 594, 24 Eng. Rep. 267 (1722). In that case the court
made the following observation: "And he said, this custom of the city of London, was the
remains of the old common law, that a man could not give away any part of his estate
without the consent of his children, and is so taken notice of in Bracton; but it being
found extremely inconvenient and hard, it was by the tacit consent of the whole nation
abrogated and grown into disuse, but what law has been ever made to repeal it? But in
the city of London, where the Mayor and aldermen have the control of orphans, they, by
that sole authority and power, have preserved this part of the common law in London,
which is disused and disapproved everywhere else." PULLING, LAws OF LONDON, 2d ed.,
181 (1854).
82 SWINBURNE, TBST&>IBNTS AND LAST W1LLs, 7th ed., 229 (1793).
ss Edwards v. Freeman, 2 P. Wms. 435, 24 Eng. Rep. 803 (1726); Holt v. Frederick,
2 P. Wms. 356, 24 Eng. Rep. 763 (1726). The following American cases state that the
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Two English cases, decided about fifty years afte:r the enactment of
the statute of distributions, state that the advancement provision contained in that legislation is based on the custom of London. The courts
did not cite any authority in support of that proposition.34 For the
reasons set forth previously, this derivation seems impossible. In addition, the English courts state that the custom was based on Roman law
and this strengthens the conclusion that the advancement provision
was taken from that law.35
Another possible source of the advancement provision in the statute
of distributions is the gift in frankrnarriage. A gift in frankrnarriage is
made to a daughter or other near relative on marriage.36 The donee
took the property free and clear of all feudal obligations except fealty
until the fourth degree, he being considered as of the first degree. 37
The theory of advancement seems to be based on the lack of feudal
obligation as set forth previously.38 If the estate of a donor descended
to his heirs in coparcenary, then a daughter who received such a gift
was compelled to bring it into hotchpot or be barred from a further
share in the estate.39 If a daughter predeceased her parents her heirs
were compelled to bring the property into hotchpot. It will be noted
that this rule applied only to daughters; it applied only to real property
and at the time of Blackstone it had fallen into disuse. 40
In addition, the recipient of a gift in frankrnarriage had to bring
into hotchpot the identical property received or be barred from further
participation in the estate, while under the advancement statute, the
advancee need only account for the value of the property.41 For these
reasons, it seems unlikely that the framers of the statute had this ancient
common law rule in mind when they drafted the legislation.
doctrine is based on the custom of London: Mitchell's Distributees v. Mitchell's Acbnr., 8
Ala. 414 (1845); In re Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., 99 Misc. 420, 163 N.Y.S. 961
(1917), reversed 181 App. Div. 642, 168 N.Y.S. 952 (1918), affirmed 225 N.Y. 666,

122 N.E. 880 (1919).
84 Kemps

v. Kelsey, supra note 31; Boyd v. Boyd, supra note 21.
35 1 PoPB, LEGAL DBPINITIONS 585 (1919); 2 STROUD, JUDICIAL DBFINlTIONS, 2d
ed., 762 (1903).
36 1 PoPB, LEGAL DEFINITIONS 585 (1919) (before the statute of de donis on the
birth of issue the donee could alienate the estate); 2 STROUD, JUDICIAL DBPINITIONS, 2d
ed., 762 (1903).
87WAMBAUGH, Lrrn.EroN's TENURES 122 et seq. (1903); 2 STROUD, JUDICIAL DEFINITIONS, 2d ed., 762 (1903); cf. 2 Coxm's FmST INs'ITl'tlTEs *721 et seq.
38 WAMBAUGH, Lrrn.EroN's TBNUREs 122 et seq. (1903); 2 Coxm's FmsT INsnTtITBs *721 et seq.; 2 BLAcxsT. CoMM. *190.
392 Coxm's FmsT lNsnTUTBs *721; WAMBAUGH, 1.nn.BToN's TBNURBs 122 (1903).
402 BLACKST. CoMM. *191.
41 2 Coxm's FmsT lNsnTUTBs *721 et seq.; W AMBAUGH, UTI'LETON's TBNURBs 122
et seq. (1903).
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All states, except New Mexico, have statutes covering advancements. Two courts, by way of dicta, have discussed the problem of
whether advancements are a part of our common law. The Nebraska
court indicates that advancements are a part of our common law and the
Missouri court states that the doctrine is not. 42 It is interesting to note
that the Nebraska court, in other cases, has uniformly held that English statutes are not a part of the common law of that jurisdiction.43
What English statutes are deemed to be in force in this country is
often a question of difficulty depending on the nature of the subject,
the differences between the character of our institutions and general
policy and those of the parent country, and on fitness and usage. 44
Generally, the American courts adhere to three views as to whether
English statutes are a part of the American common law. These are
that no such legislation is included; that statutes passed by Parliament
prior to the Declaration of Independence are included; and that statutes
enacted in England prior to the settlement of Jamestown are included. 45 In all states which hold that English statutes are a part of their
common law, only those statutes which are of a general nature and
applicable to new conditions and surroundings have been adopted.
Consequently, some states hold particular statutes to be in force46
while others do not. 47
In New Mexico, the court follows the view that English statutes
passed prior to the Declaration of Independence are a part of the common law. Since the advancement provision of the English statute of
42 In re Williams' Estate, 62 Mo. App. 339 (1895); In re Gibson's Estate, 130 Neb.
278, 264 N.W. 762 (1936).
43 Farmer's and Merchant's Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 58 Neb. 522, 78 N.W. 1054 (1899).
44 Going v. Emery, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 107 (1834).
45 McKean, "British Statutes in American Jurisdiction," 78 UNIV, PA. L. REv. 195
(1929) is an excellent and comprehensive discussion of all American law on this problem.
The author discusses each jurisdiction separately. Cf. 1 JotrnNALS OF CoNGREss 28
(1800). The Continental Congress adopted the following resolution: "Resolved N.C.D. 5.
That the respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage,
according to the course of that law.
"Resolved 6. That they are entitled to the benefit of such of the English statutes, as
existed at the time of their colonization; and which they have, by experience, respectively
found to be applicable to their several local and other circumstances."
46 Summers v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 335 Ill. 564, 167 N.E. 777 (1929);
State Bank and Trust Co. v. Patridge, 198 Ky. 403, 248 S.W. 1056 (1923); Peirce v.
Attwill, 234 Mass. 389, 125 N.E. 609 (1920); Harger v. Barrett, 319 Mo. 633, 5 S.W.
(2d) ll00 (1928).
•
4 7Newark Methodist Church First Soc. v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730, 3 N.W. 207 (1879);
Utica Trust Co. v. Thompson, 87 Misc. 31, 149 N.Y.S. 392 (1914); Seaburn v. Seaburn,
56 Va. (15 Gratt.) 423 (1859).
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distributions was enacted in 1670 it is likely that the New Mexico
court would hold it to be a part of their common law.48

III
AnvANCEMENTS DEFINED AND DISTINGUISHED

A. Advancements Defined
The concept of advancement is of purely statutory ongm and
depends on the legislation of each state for its force and effect as a
legal doctrine.49 For this reason, it is incapable of precise definition.
However, courts and legal writers define it in various ways. The following definitions are typical:
"An advancement is the giving by the intestate in his lifetime,
by anticipation, the whole or part of what it is supposed the donee
will be entitled to on the death of the party making it."50
"An advancement is an irrevocable gift by the parent to a child
in anticipation of the child's future share of the estate."51
''In its strict technical sense an advancement is a perfect and
irrevocable gift, not required by law, made by a parent, during his
lifetime, to his child, with the intention on the part of the donor
that such gift shall represent a part or whole of the portion of the
donor's estate that the donee would be entitled to on the death of
the donor intestate."52
Each of the definitions indicates that an advancement depends on
the intent of the advancor. However, the Kentucky statute provides:
"Any real or personal property or money, given or devised by a parent
or grandparent to a descendant, shall be charged as an advancement to
the descendant . . . in the division and distribution of the undevised
estate of the parent or grandparent...."53 That legislation makes the
intent of the advancor immaterial and contains the qualification that
the intent of the advancor determines whether maintenance or education of a child is an advancement.54 The legislation of several other
states also provides that education and maintenance of a child is not an
48 Albright v. Territory, 13 N.W. 64, 79 P. 719 (1905); Armijo v. Neher, 11 N.M.
645, 72 P. 12 (1903); Browning v. Estate of Browning, 3 N.M. 659, 9 P. 677 (1886).
49 Notes 39 to 45 supra.
so Grattan v. Grattan, 18 ill. (8 Peck) 167 (1856).
51 Fell v. Bradshaw, 205 Iowa 100, 215 N.W. 595 (1927).
1121 AM. Jtrn., Advancements §3, p. 715.
53 Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) §391.140.
Mlbid.
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advancement unless intended as such by the advancor. In these and
other states, the statute, with respect to other transfers, is either similar
to the Kansas statute, which reads in part as follows: "Property which
has been given by an intestate decedent by way of an advancement to
one ..."65 or the Oklahoma statute, which reads in part as follows:
"Any estate . . . given by the decedent in his lifetime as an advancement. ..."56 Although these statutes do not expressly state that the intent of the advancor determines whether a transfer of property is an
advancement, the courts in those states hold that the intent of the
advancor determines whether the transfer is an advancement or absolute gift.57 The South Carolina statute reads in part as follows: " ...
where such child or issue shall have been advanced by the intestate.
58
• • ."
In that state, the intent of the transferor is immaterial and all
substantial voluntary inter vivas transfers are advancements.59
The Georgia statute provides: " . . . Donations from affection, and
not made with a view to an accounting, nor intended as advancements,
shall not be accounted for as such...." 60 That state is the only one in
which the statute expressly provides that advancements depend on the
advancor's intent.
Some states require all advancements to be charged in writing and
if not so charged, they are absolute gifts. 61 In most states no such legislation exists.
Since the legislation in the different states varies as to the type of
beneficiaries covered, no one definition is adequate. For instance, the
Georgia statute applies between parent and child;62 the Kansas legislation applies to anyone to whom the decedent's property would pass in
case of intestacy;68 and the legislative enactment of Kentucky applies
where the parties are a parent or grandparent and their descendants. 64
Other jurisdictions by statute provide that advancements are applicable
to the following groups: "child,"65 "child or lineal descendant," 66
55 Laws

of Kansas (1939) c. 180, §32, p. 308.

56 Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 84, §223.
57 See Part VI-A infra. [To be published
58 S.C. Code Ann. (1942) §8909.
59 Rees v. Rees, 11 Rich Eq. (S.C.)

subsequently.-Ed.]

86 (1859).
Code Ann. (Park 1937) §113-1013.
61 See Part VI-E infra. [To be published subsequently.-Ed.]
62 Ga. Code Ann. (Park 1937) §113-1013.
68 Laws of Kansas (1939) c. 180, §32, p. 308.
64 Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) §391.140.
65 Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) tit. 61, §116; Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 176, §5; Mo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. (1939) §311; N.Y. Decedent's Estate Law §85 (1939); N.C. Gen. Stat.
60Ga.
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"children and their issue,"67 "heirs,"68 "children and other descendants,"69 "any person," 70 "child or grandchild," 71 and "descendant or
collateral."72
The definitions require advancements to be made in the lifetime
of the intestate. But the Kentucky statute provides that devises and
bequests made by a person who dies intestate as to part of his property
are advancements.73 Since the will speaks from the death of the testator, an advancement can be made at the death of the advancor.
Two of the definitions state that the doctrine is applicable only
when the party making the advancement dies intestate. However, the
statutes in several states, including Kentucky, provide that the advancee
must account for all advancements received by him where the
advancor's will does not dispose of all his property.74
This analysis demonstrates that the definitions do not accurately
state the law of advancements as it exists in all states. By relying on
textbook definitions and decisions of a foreign jurisdiction, courts have
decided cases incorrectly. To reach a proper result, courts and lawyers
must first consider the legislation of their states. If the statute does not
answer the problem, they may consult cases from other jurisdictions.
In considering these cases they should always read the advancement
statute of that jurisdiction to determine whether it is sufficiently similar
to the statute of their state to be used as a precedent.
From this study of the general field of advancements it will be
observed that the statutes and definitions agree in only two particulars:
(I) all advancements must be gifts and (2) all advancements must be
accounted for on the settlement of the advancor's estate. But over and
Ann. (1943) §28-150; Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie 1938) §8403; Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann.
(1945) §6-2504.
66 Ala. Code. Ann. (1940) tit. 16, §14; Idaho Code Ann. (1932) §14-107; Ind. Ann.
Stat. (Burns 1933) §6-1503; Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 196, §3; Mich. Stat. Ann.
(1937) §27.3178 (162); Minn. Stat. Ann. (1946) §525.53; Mont. Rev. Code Ann.
(1947) §91-412; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §30-117; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §30-2112;
Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 84, §223; S.D. Code (1939) §56.0114; Utah Code Ann. (1943)
§101-4-18; Vt. Stat. (1947) §3066; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1932) §1348.

67 Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §30-107; 1 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1948) art. 2576.
68 Cal. Probate Code (Deering 1941) §1051; Iowa Code (1946) §636.44; Laws of
Kansas (1939) c. 180, §32, p. 308; N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 360, §13.
69 Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. (1949) §7058; Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §475.
70Fla. Stat. (1941) §734.07; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1949) tit. 20, §1.9.
71 Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 156, §4; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. (1938) c. 567, §23.
72Va. Code Ann. (1950) §64-17; W.Va. Code Ann. (1949) §4094.
1s Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) §391.140.
74 Ibid. See Part VI-D(l) infra. [To be published subsequently.-Ed.]
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beyond these two fundamental postulates the various possibilities and
ramifications are so numerous that the mere suggestion of a uniform
definition is foolhardy.

B. Advancements Distinguished
In order to obtain an intelligible description of advancements, we
must distinguish them from similar transactions.

I. Advancements Distinguished from a Sale. An advancement
differs from a sale in that it does not require a consideration. 75 However, if a parent sells property to a child for an inadequate price, the
courts may charge the child with the difference between the fair market value and the price actually paid as an advancement.76
2. Advancements Distinguished from Debts. In Hughes's
Appeal,77 the Pennsylvania court distinguished an advancement from a
debt in the following appropriate language:
"A debt is but a set-off in equity against the share of the distributee. It must therefore be one which is subsisting and recoverable at the time of the father's death, in order to constitute an
available defalcation of the son's distributive share. An advancement is different, and is not affected by lapse of time of limitation.
It does not operate by way of set-off or defalcation, but by a legal
abstraction of that much from the child's share in the father's lifetime; therefore leaving the share that much less at his death.
Operating thus by anticipation, it is not controlled by the same
defences, such as infancy, limitations, etc., as prevent the recovery
of debts."
3. Advancements Distinguished from the Right of Retainer.
Some jurisdictions recognize a doctrine which, in legal parlance, is
known as the right of retainer. Although this rule is not related to the
advancement concept, it often accomplishes a similar result, and consequently courts are often confused when called upon to distinguish the
two.
75 Dillman v. Cox, 23 Ind. 440 (1864); First Nat. Bank of Concordia v. McIntosh
and Peters Livestock and Comm. Co., 72 Kan. 603, 84 P. 535 (1906); Caldwell Building
and Loan Assn. v. Henry, 120 N.J. Eq. 425, 185 A. 394 (1936); Childress v. Hinch, 162
Okla. 296, 20 P. (2d) 571 (1935); Carroll v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 107 S.W. (2d) 770.
76 Holland v. Bonner, 142 Ark. 214, 218 S.W. 665 (1920); Mossestad v. Gunderson,
140 Iowa 290, 118 N.W. 374 (1908); Harrelson v. Gooden, 229 N.C. 654, 50 S.E. (2d)
901 (1948).
1157 Pa. (7 P. F. Smith) 179 (1868).
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By using the right of retainer doctrine, the personal representative
of a deceased person can obtain priority over the creditors of an heir or
devisee who is indebted to the estate78 and collect debts owed by an
heir or devisee even though they are barred by limitations.79 That rule is
based on a legal or moral obligation to pay a debt owed the deceased, 80
whereas an advancement is not based on any obligation, but it is a gift
that the advancee must account for on the settlement of the advancor's
estate. 81

4. Advancements Distinguished from Gi~s. All advancements
are gifts but the converse does not necessarily follow. 82 For this
reason it is necessary to distinguish the two doctrines. The former differs from the latter in that they must be accounted for on the settlement
of the advancor's estate while it is not necessary to account for a gift. 83
Courts, in defining advancements, customarily state that they are
irrevocable gifts. Such a statement is not necessarily true. For
instance, a settlor may create a revocable trust, and if he dies without
exercising the power of revocation, the courts hold that even though the
gift was not irrevocable until his death the amount received by the
beneficiary is an advancement.84

5. Advancements Distinguished from Provisions in Wills Charging Advancements. In discussing the definition of advancements,
it was pointed out that ordinarily the doctrine is applicable only to cases
of total intestacy. If a person has made an advancement and then
decides to make a will, he cannot rely on the technical rules of advancements to charge the advancee with the amount so advanced. Lawyers
solve a problem of this type by providing that all advancements made
prior or subsequent to a will are to be charged to the devisee on the
settlement of the testator's estate. 85
78 Stanton v. Stanton, 133 Neb. 563, 276 N.W. 180 (1937); In re Jackson's Estate,
200 Wash. 116, 93 P. (2d) 349 (1939).
79Thompson v. McCune, 333 Mo. 758, 63 S.W. (2d) 41 (1933).
80 Ibid.
s1 Ellis v. Newell, 120 Iowa 71, 94 N.W. 463 (1903); Day v. Grubbs, 235 Ky. 741,
32 S.W. (2d) 327 (1930); Brewer's Admr. v. Brewer, 181 Ky. 400, 205 S.W. 393 (1918).
82 Clark v. Warner, 6 Conn. 355 (1827); Hanssen v. Karbe, 234 Mo. App. 663, 115
S.W. (2d) 109 (1938).
83 Duckett v. Gerig, 223 ID. 284, 79 N.E. 94 (1906); Brewer's Admr. v. Brewer, 181
Ky. 400, 205 S.W. 393 (1918); Hon v. Connelly, 253 Ky. 181, 69 S.W. (2d) 23
(1934); Carroll v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 107 S.W.
(2d) 770; Weatherhead v. Field, 26 Vt. 665 (1854); Wheeler v. Wheeler's Estate, 47 Vt.
637 (1874); Waldron v. Taylor, 52 W.Va. 284, 45 S.E. 336 (1902).
84 Hughey v. Eichelberger, 11 S.C. 36 (1878).
85 Sartain v. Davis, 323 lli. 269, 154 N.E. 101 (1926); In re Vilsack's Estate, 226
Pa. 379, 75 A. 604 (1910); Jackson v. Jackson, 25 Tenn. App. 198, 154 S.W. (2d) 797
(1939).
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Such a procedure permits a testator to make an advancement and
to preserve a desired equality without executing a new will. That procedure does not aJways accomplish the results intended by the testator.
Such a provision simply adopts the advancement concept, and the court
must go outside the four corners of the will and admit parol evidence
to determine whether a transfer of property is an advancement, loan or
gift. 86 For instance, in Inre Harrison's Estate, 87 a testator, by his last will
and testament, forgave his son and daughter "any advances which may
be charged on my books as of the date of this will." At his death, and
on the day the will was executed, his books contained an advancement
account and a loan account with his son. Held, the provision in
the will did not convert the loan account to an absolute gift. In that
case the testator could have accomplished the same result by deleting
from his will the provision charging advancements.
In Pole v. Simmons, 88 a testatrix gave certain sums of money to
some of her children and by a paper executed at the same time stated
that the sums so given were "absolute gifts." Subsequently, she made
a will and directed that her children should be charged interest on all
money advanced to them from the time they received it up to the time
of her death. Held, the will did not convert the absolute gifts to
advancements.
Also, such draftsmanship does not determine the value of the
advancement charged by the will or whether interest should be
charged on the advancement after the testator's death. When such
problems are presented to the courts, they adopt the technical doctrine
of advancements. 89
If a testator must charge advancements by will, he should, in order
to avoid disputes among his devisees and legatees, specify the exact sum
to be charged. If he makes an advancement after the execution of the
will, he should execute a codicil.
A testator, by charging advancements in a will can accomplish
things that are not possible under advancement statutes. He may
charge advancements to individuals not within the scope of legislative
enactment; 90 he may charge interest;91 he may change a loan to an
86 Alward v. Woodward, 315 ill. 150, 146 N.E. 154 (1925).
87 298 Pa. 514, 148 A. 704 (1930).
88 45 Md. 246 (1876).
89 Jackson v. Jackson, 25 Tenn. App. 198, 154 S.W. (2d) 797 (1939).
90 Talbott's Exr. v. Goetz, 286 Ky. 504, 151 S.W. (2d) 369 (1941); In

re Bresler's
Estate, 155 Mich. 567, 119 N.W. 1104 (1909).
91 Shaw v. Grimes, 187 Ky. 250, 218 S.W. 447 (1920); Skinner v. Cottril, 148 Iowa
633, 127 N.W. 986 (1910); Nelson v. Wyan, 21 Mo. 347 (1855); In re Lear's Estate,
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advancement92 and he may charge an absolute gift as a part of the
devisee's inheritance.93
Since the person drafting a will customarily denotes such a provision as an advancement, the courts use the term in construing it.94
The doctrine of advancements, in its technical sense, has no place in
any of these cases. The courts are merely construing a testamentary
instrument and attempting to ascertain the intent of the testator. 95 For
the sake of clarity in judicial decision, the courts should point out that
their conclusion is based on the intent of the testator as appears in the
will, and not on advancement statutes. 96 Most of these cases are decided by analogy to cases involving the doctrine in its technical sense.
For that reason, many of these decisions will be referred to in the course
of this monograph.
6. Advancements Distinguished from Advances. The doctrine of
advances is often claimed to be synonymous with advancements. The
146 Mo. App. 642, 124 S.W. 592 (1910); Dodson v. Fulk, 147 N.C. 530, 61 S.E. 383
(1908); Jackson v. Jackson, 25 Tenn. App. 198, 154 S.W. (2d) 797 (1939). Cf. In re
Whitehead's Estate, 260 Pa. 22, 103 A. 502 (1918).
92 Hall v. Davis, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 450 (1826); Hanssen v. Karbe, 234 Mo. App.
663, 115 S.W. (2d) 109 (1938); Wentworth v. Wentworth, 75 N.H. 547, 78 A. 646
(1910); In re Knight's Estate, 253 Pa. 290, 98 A. 558 (1916); Wyatt v. Wyatt, (Tex.
Civ. App. 1945) 188 S.W. (2d) 685; Jones v. Jones, 163 Tenn. 237, 43 S.W. (2d) 205
(1931); Dame's fur. v. Lloyd, 82 Va. 859, 5 S.E. 87 (1887).
93 Albrecht v. Fisher, 14 Ohio App. 195 (1921).
94Afward v. Woodward, 315 ill. 150, 146 N.E. 154 (1925); Yundt's Appeal, 13 Pa.
St. (1 Harris) 575 (1850).
95 Treadwell v. Everett, 185 Ga. 454, 195 S.E. 762 (1938); Ransone v. Arnold, 183
Ga. 184, 187 S.E. 857 (1936); In re Palmer's Estate, 194 Iowa 611, 190 N.W. 30 (1922);
In re Pickard's Estate, 42 Utah 105, 129 P. 353 (1912).
96 Ransone v. Arnold, 183 Ga. 184, 187 S.E. 857 (1936); In re Grauer's Estate, 231
Iowa 601, l N.W. (2d) 694 (1942); In re Francis Estate, 204 Iowa 1237, 212 N.W. 306
(1927); Buchanan v. Hunter, 166 Iowa 663, 148 N.W. 881 (1914); Jones v. Jones' furs.,
198 Ky. 756, 250 S.W. 92 (1923); Christman v. Christman's Estate, 108 Miss. 37, 66 S. 285
(1914); In re Reichelt's Estate, (Mo. App. 1944) 179 S.W. (2d) 119. In that case atestator devised his residuary estate to his five children in equal shares. The will provided that
all advancements made to his children should be deducted from their share of the residuary
estate. The court pointed out that the question of advancements as such did not have a place
in the case. In re Willis' Will, 158 Misc. 534, 287 N.Y.S. 165 (1936); In re Laughlin's Estate,
157 Pa. Super. 155, 42 A. (2d) 173 (1945) reversed In re Laughlin's Estate, 354 Pa. 43, 46
A. (2d) 477 (1946); In re Manderscheid's Will, 192 Wis. 200, 212 N.W. 247 (1927);
cf. In re Kocher's Estate, 354 Pa. 81, 46 A. (2d) 488 (1946). In that case a testator
transferred 210 shares of stock to her son. They agreed that he was to pay her $100 at the
time of transfer and $25 a month during her natural life. They also agreed that it was
not an advancement. In her ,vill she charged the stock to the son as an advancement.
Held, the provision in the will was invalid. The court said at p. 86: "That Mrs. Kocher
could, in her will, have cut her son Charles off altogether, cannot be denied. But what she
agreed, for valuable consideration received, was that she would not discriminate against him
for the sole reason of the stock transaction-in other words, that she would not take that
transaction into account in disposing of her estate. By the express terms of her will, she
violated that obligation."
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New York case of Ebeling v. Ebeling; 7 presents the problem in a very
appropriate manner. In that case, a testator gave his son a legacy of
$500 and at the same time provided that all advances were to be
deducted from the bequest. He was surety for his son on a note and
on the latter's default, he was obliged to pay. On the settlement of the
estate, the executor sought to deduct this amount from the son's legacy.
The son's attorneys contended that "advances" and "advancements"
were one and the same and since the payment of his obligation did not
contain the elements of a gift, it could not be deducted from his share
in the estate. That theory was held untenable in the following
language:
"It is true that the words 'advances' and 'advancements' are
sometimes improperly considered as interchangeable. But there is
a clear distinction between them. To advance money is to pay it
before it is due, or to furnish it for a certain specified purpose with
the understanding that it, or some equivalent, is to be returned.
An advancement is an irrevocable gift by a parent to a child, in
anticipation of such child's future share in the parent's estate...." 98
Some jurisdictions give the term "advance" a more extensive meaning. For instance, in Arizona if a person makes an "advance" to another, the relation is one of debtor and creditor, or the transaction is an
absolute gift.99

7. Advancement Distinguished from Ademption and Satisfaction.
In Wallace v. DuBois,100 a testator died in 1884 leaving a will executed
in 1879. The will gave one son a legacy of $6000. The executor
contended that certain sums of money given the son in 1882 for the
purpose of entering business should be treated as an ademption or satisfaction pro tanto of the legacy. The court so held and pointed out that
if a father gives a legacy to a child without any specific purpose in
mind, the legacy is regarded as a portion of the estate intended for such
child. And, if the parent afterwards makes an advancement to the
child on marriage or going into business, it is presumed to be a payment
or satisfaction of the legacy either pro tanto or in full. The court, in
that case, did not treat the transfer of property as an advancement in
its technical sense, but merely used the word to show that the parent
61 Misc. 537, ll5 N.Y.S. 894 (1908).
Id. at 539.
99 Paine v. Cooper Belle Mining Co., 13 Ariz. 406, ll4 P. 964 (19ll); Chase v.
Ewing, 51 Barb. (N.Y.) 597 (1868).
10-0 65 Md. 153 (1885).
97
98
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transferred the property to his son after making a will. However, since
courts often use the term in such a manner, it is necessary to distinguish
between the doctrines of ademption and advancement.
In American law the word "ademption" has two distinct meanings:
(I) to indicate the loss of a legacy by the loss or destruction of the subject matter in the lifetime of the testator, or by the loss, transfer or
termination of the testator's interest therein before his death101 and
(2) with reference to the act of a testator in paying to the legatee in
his lifetime a legacy which the testator has given to the legatee by
will, or in satisfying such legacy by giving in place thereof, something
of value.102 Some courts call the last rule "ademption by satisfaction."103 Often the words "ademption" and "satisfaction" and corre. wards "adeem" and "sat1s
· fy" are used by JU
· dges and textspandmg
writers as convertible terms having the same signification. However,
most courts hold that ademption, in its strict sense, applies only to
specific legacies, and satisfaction to general legacies.104
The doctrine of advancements differs from ademption and satisfaction in that the former is a gift in praesenti of money or property, usually
to a child by a parent, to enable the advancee to anticipate his inheritance pro tanto, and ordinarily applies only where the advancor dies
intestate. The latter is ordinarily the extinction of or withholding of
a legacy in consequence of some act of the testator. 105 The doctrine of
ademption, in the sense that it operates as a satisfaction of a legacy, is
applied on the same principle as advancements in cases of intestacy. It
is founded on the presumption that a parent intends that all the natural
objects of his bounty shall share equally in his estate. Therefore, when
he devises property or money to a child and subsequently makes a gift
of property to a child, it is presumed that he intends to take away the
legacy in whole or in proportion to the value of the gift.100
Because of the close similarity between the doctrines of advancement and ademption by satisfaction, legislatures in enacting the
101 Carter v. First National Bank, 237 Ala. 47, 185 S. 361 (1938); In re Babb's Estate,
200 Cal. 252, 252 P. 1039 (1927); Buder v. Stocke, 343 Mo. 506, 121 S.W. (2d) 852
(1938).
102 In re Keeler's Estate, 225 Iowa 1349, 282 N.W. 362 (1938); Dillender v. Wilson,
228 Ky. 758, 16 S.W. (2d) 173 (1929); Buder v. Stocke, 343 Mo. 506, 121 S.W. (2d)
852 (1938).
103 Bond v. Evans, 92 Colo. 1, 17 P. (2d) 311 (1932); Heileman v. Dakan, 211
Iowa 344, 233 N.W. 542 (1930).
104 In re Brown's Estate, 139 Iowa 219, 117 N.W. 260 (1908); Beck v. McGillis,
9 Barb. (N.Y.) 35 (1850).
105 Ellard v. Ferris, 91 Ohio St. 339, 110 N.E. 476 (1915).

ioo Ibid.
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statutes tend to commingle and confuse the terms. For instance, the
Kentucky ademption statute provides that an advancement to any person shall be deemed a satisfaction of a bequest contained in a prior
will.107 Courts have often become confused in their thinking because
of a failure to distinguish between the two doctrines. In Bush 11.
Bush,1° 8 a testator executed a will in 1931 and subsequent to that date
he took non-interest-bearing notes from his son which recited that they
were to be deducted from his share of the father's estate. The will
made the son a residuary legatee and the court ruled that the doctrine
of advancements was applicable. Actually, the court was thinking of
satisfaction pro tanto, and its holding should have been based on that
ground.109

8. Advancements Distinguished from Release of Expectancy.
Many decisions refer to release of expectancy as an advancement in
full. 110 Using that statement as a premise, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin in Liese 11. Fontaine111 held that a release of expectancy,
like an advancement, must be charged in writing. That opinion, and
many others, fail to consider the fundamental differences between the
two doctrines. For that reason, a comparison is helpful.
An heir may dispose of his prospective inheritance in two ways:
(I) by executing an assignment to some third person112 and. (2) by
executing a release to the person from whom he expects to inherit.113
In this monograph we are concerned only with the second method.
That doctrine means that a prospective heir for a present consideration
gives up to an ancestor any right he may have to share in his estate.11 4
Most jurisdictions uphold a release of expectancy.115 Other states
hold such a release invalid because as a fundamental principle neces101 Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) §394.370.
10s 155 Kan. 556, 127 P. (2d) 455 (1942).
1oowallace v. DuBois, 65 Md. 153 (1885); Hays v. Welling, 38 R.I. 553, 96 A. 843
(1916); Montefiore v. Guedalla, 1 De G. F. and J. 93, 45 Eng. Rep. 294 (1859).
110 Simon v. Simon's Estate, 158 Mich. 256, 122 N.W. 544 (1909); Nesmith v.
Dinsmore, 17 N.H. 515 (1845); Anderson v. Forbes, 169 Tenn. 223, 84 S.W. (2d)
(1935); Coffman v. Coffman, 41 W.Va. 8, 23 S.E. 523 (1895); Liesse v. Fontaine, 181
Wis. 407, 195 N.W. 393 (1923); Liginger v. Field, 78 Wis. 367, 47 N.W. 613 (1890).
111 181 Wis. 407, 195 N.W. 393 (1923).
112 A'I'KINSON, WILLS §241, p. 684 (1937).
113 ATKINSON, WILLS §240, p. 680 (1937).
114 Riddell v. Riddell, 70 Neb. 472, 97 N.W. 609 (1903); Green v. Hathway, 36
N.J. Eq. (9 Stew.) 471 (1883).
115 See note llO supra; Leggett v. Martin, 203 Ark. 88, 156 S.W. (2d) 71 (1941);
Felton v. Brown, 102 Ark. 658, 145 S.W. 552 (1912); Home Mixture Guano Co. v.
McKoone, 168 Ga. 317, 147 S.E. 7ll (1929); Bishop v. Davenport, 58 ill. 105 (1867);
Boyer v. Boyer, 62 Ind. App. 73, lll N.E. 952 (19ll); Chidchester v. Harlan, 180 Iowa
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sary to the validity of every bargain and sale, there must be a grantor,
grantee and a thing in being to be granted. Since a prospective heir
has no interest in the property of an ancestor, either remote or contingent, the mere possibility of having such an interest at some future time
cannot be made the subject of a bargain and sale.116 In Elliott v.
Leslie,117 the Kentucky court, because of that state's advancement
statute, which is designed to prevent a parent from discriminating
among his children unless he ( 1) disposes of all his property in his lifetime or (2) disposes of all his property by will, held that a release of
expectancy is contrary to public policy.
In most states, the courts have avoided these objections by holding
that such an agreement is enforceable in equity. These courts point
out that because of the release, the ancestor refrained from making a
will, and that the courts, by holding that the heir is estopped from repudiating the agreement, are compelling him to keep his promise.118
As indicated earlier, other courts uphold such an agreement as an
advancement in full. 119 Courts that uphold such a release on the
theory that it is an advancement in full fail to consider the fundamental differences between the two doctrines.
The advancement concept is of purely statutory origin120 whereas
the release of expectancy doctrine is a creature of the equity courts.121
In most states, the doctrine of advancements is applicable only if the
parties are parent and child or grandparent and grandchild. The
release of expectancy doctrine includes all ancestors and prospective
heirs, thereby including collateral relatives.122 An advancement is a
gift; a release of expectancy is a contract.123 The latter doctrine
depends on the assent of both the ancestor and the prospective heir. 124
171, 159 N.W. 659 (1916); Callicott and Norfleet v. Callicott, 90 Miss. 221, 43 S. 616
(1907); Douglass v. Hammel, 313 Mo. 514, 285 S.W. 433 (1926); Green v. Hathway, 36
N.J. Eq. (9 Stew.) 471 (1883).
116 Cass v. Brown, 68 N.H. 85, 44 A. 86 (1894); Cannon v. Nowell, 51 N.C. (6
Jones L.) 436 (1859); Needles v. Needles, 7 Ohio St. 432 (1857); In re Thompson's
Estate, 26 S.D. 576, 128 N.W. ll27 (1910); Simonds v. Simonds' Estate, 96 Vt. II0,
103 A. 103 (1922); Headrick v. McDowell, 102 Va. 124, 45 S.E. 804 (1903).
117 124 Ky. 553, 99 S.W. 619 (1907). In jurisdictions which hold a release of
expectancy invalid, the consideration received by the child for the release is charged to
him as an advancement. Ratliff v. Meade, 184 Va. 328, 35 S.E. (2d) ll4 (1945).
118 See note ll5 supra.
119 See note II0 supra.
120 Text pages 666 and 674 supra.
121 See note ll5 supra.
122 Leggett v. Martin, 203 Ark. 88, 156 S.W. (2d) 71 (1941).
123 Adams v. Adams, 82 W.Va. 244, 95 S.E. 859 (1918).
124 Nelson v. Brown, (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) Ill S.W. II06.
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The former doctrine depends on the intent of the advancor and the
intent of the advancee is generally regarded as immaterial.1 25 Of
course, in some cases, both the advancor and advancee agree that a
voluntary inter vivas transfer is an advancement. Such cases can be
justified as a partial release of expectancy.126
A minor, who has released his expectancy, can disaffirm on becoming of age. An advancee cannot.127 A release of expectancy is recognized in cases of partial intestacy; in most states, an advancement is
not.128 The burden of proving that a prospective heir has released his
expectancy is on the party asserting such fact and the evidence must
be clear, cogent and convincing.129 When the party alleging advancement proves a voluntary inter vivas transfer from the ancestor to heir,
the presumption of advancement arises and the heir must prove that
the ancestor intended to make an absolute gift.130 Proof of such a
conveyance is insufficient to show a release of expectancy.131
When a child receives an advancement and predeceases his parent,
its value is charged to his children in determining their share of the
grandfather's estate.132 Cases that hold a release of expectancy to be
an advancement in full adhere to the same rule.133 A minority of
jurisdictions reject the premise that a release of expectancy is an advancement in full. They hold that a release of expectancy does not bar
grandchildren from inheriting from their grandfather, even though
their father had released his expectancy.134
The only justification for the majority rule is that it operates not as
a contract, conveyance or transfer but as an extinguishment of the
releasor's right to take any estate by descent. It obliterates the right to
inherit just as though the heir expectant had died without issue before
the death of the ancestor. A release of expectancy is not an advancement
125 See Part VI-A infra. [To be published subsequently.-Ed.]
126 Swigert v. Miles, 75 Ind. App. 85, 130 N.E. 130 (1921).
127 Cf. Jones v. Jones, 46 Iowa 466 (1877); Adams v. Adams, 82

W.Va. 244, 95 S.E.
859 (1918).
128 Callicott and Norfleet v. Callicott, 90 Miss. 221, 43 S. 616 (1907); Part VI-D(l)
infra. [To be published subsequently.-Ed.]
129 Graham v. Karr, 331 Mo. 1157, 55 S.W. (2d) 995 (1932); Douglass v. Hammel,
313 Mo. 514, 285 S.W. 433 (1926).
130 Part IX-D infra. [To be published subsequently.-Ed.]
131 Note 129 supra.
132 Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 16, §18; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) §391.140; Douglass v.
Hammel, 313 Mo. 514, 285 S.W. 433 (1926).
133 Anderson v. Forbes, 169 Tenn. 223, 84 S.W. (2d) 104 (1935).
134 Douglass v. Hammel, 313 Mo. 514, 285 S.W. 433 (1926); Mow v. Baker, (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928) 12 S.W. (2d) 1091 affirmed in part and reversed in part (Tex. Supp.
1930) 24 S.W. (2d) I.
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in full; it is an agreement by which an heir gives up his right to inherit.
Such an agreement is personal to the releasor and should not bind his
heirs. If a child is indebted to his father and predeceases him, the
amount of the debts are not charged as a part of the grandchildren's
inheritance. Likewise, his agreement releasing his inheritance should
not bar his children from a share of their grandfather's estate.

IV
PERSONS INCLUDED IN ADVANCEMENT STATUTES

In our discussion of the definition of advancements we saw that
the legislation in the various jurisdictions imposes limits on the persons
who may make and are chargeable with advancements. Therefore, a
discussion of the persons included in the doctrine is appropriate.

A. In Loco Parentis
The American and English Encyclopedia of Law defines an
advancement as follows: "An advancement is a transfer of property
from a person standing in loco parentis towards another, to that other,
in anticipation of the share of the donor's estate which the donee would
receive in the event of the donor's dying intestate."135
The New York court, although the statute of that state reads "parent to child," stated that a voluntary inter vivos transfer from one standing in loco parentis to another was an advancement.136 Other cases
have recognized that rule.137 This erroneous interpretation was
occasioned by consulting textbooks without first consulting the advancement statute. A person may stand in loco parentis to another, yet that
other may be a niece or nephew who would inherit in the event he died
intestate. However, they would not be included within the term "child"
contained in the advancement statute.
135 1 Amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., §1, p. 760.
136 Browron v. Kent, 51 Misc. 136, 100 N.Y.S. 768 (1906)

modified 120 App. Div.
74, 105 N.Y.S. 138 (1907) reversed 190 N.Y. 422, 83 N.E. 472 (1908).
137 In re Kennedy's Estate, 154 Iowa 460, 135 N.W. 53 (1912). In that case a wife
elected to take against her husband's will. Her children sought to charge her with the
value of property conveyed by their father to her in his lifetime as an advancement. Held,
that she could not be charged with advancements because the doctrine is applicable only
where the donor stands in loco parentis to the advancee. The court did not consider the
advancement statute of that state which uses the word "heirs" [Iowa Code (1946) §636.44]
but relied on the quotation set out in the text. Mott v. Iossa, 119 N.J. Eq. 185, 181 A.
689 (1935). That case recognized the rule but the question was whether the transaction
was a gift or a resulting trust. Cf. Leask v. McCarty, 147 App. Div. 796, 132 N.Y.S. 92
(1911). In that case the dissenting opinion sought to apply the dictum of Browron v.
Kent, supra note 136.
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In some jurisdictions the statute is comprehensive enough to include persons who fall within the loco parentis classification. That
legislation covers the following advancees: "any person,"138 "heir,"139
"and descendant or collateral."140 In these states the basis of the rule
is not the loco parentis relationship, but the fact that the doctrine applies
to collateral relatives. This rule is subject to the exception that the
advancee must, at the time of the transaction, have been entitled to inherit from the advancor if the latter died intestate.141

B. Parent and Child
From our previous discussion, we saw that in all states the doctrine
applies to parent and child. However, in the early development of ·the
concept of advancements, the courts were faced with the difficulty of
determining whether a voluntary inter vivos transfer from a mother to
a child was an advancement. In Holt 11. Frederick,1 42 the English court
pointed out that the doctrine was based on the custom of London; that
the custom was intended for persons engaged in trade; that women
were not engaged in trade and that consequently they were incapable of
making an advancement. That case remained law in England until
1925, when the enactment of the Administration of Estates Act made
the doctrine applicable to "all deceased persons, male or female." 143
The same argument was advanced in this country in the cases of
Kintz 11. Friday144 and Rees 11. Rees.145 In both opinions the court
rejected that contention because the words "intestate" and "decedent"
used in the advancement statute cover both a man and a woman.
When the advancement provision was enacted as a part of the
statute of distributions the law of primogeniture existed in England.
Under that doctrine, the eldest son inherited all of the real property of
his parent and accordingly the statute was drafted as follows:
" . . . but the heir at law, notwithstanding any land he shall
have by descent or otherwise from the intestate, is to have an equal
part in the distribution with the rest of the children, without any
138 Fla.

Stat. (1941) §734.07; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1949) tit. 20, §1.9.
of Kansas (1939) c. 180, §32, p. 308.
140 W.Va. Code Ann. (1948) §4094.
141 Corlett v. May, 126 Fla. 506, 171 S. 517 (1936).
1422 P. Wms. 356, 24 Eng. Rep. 763 (1726).
143 15 Geo. V, c. 23, §471 (1925); 2 Halsbury's Laws of England, 2d ed., 585
(1933).
144 4 Dem. Sur. 540 (N.Y. 1886).
• 145 11 Rich. Eq. (S.C.) 86 (1859).
139 Laws
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consideration of the value of the land which he hath by descent or
otherwise from the intestate...."146
Since the law of primogeniture is not applicable in the United States,
the eldest son must account for advancements made to him by the
intestate, whether they be realty or personalty.147
C. Parent and Adopted Child
Since adoptions are commonplace, the states by statute have enacted legislation defining the rights and liabilities of the parties. Many
families consist of one or more adopted children, as well as one or more
natural children. Often advancements are made either to the adopted
or natural children and on the parent's death intestate, the other children may seek to compel them to account for the value of the property.
In such a case, attorneys for adopted children, if the statute reads
"issue," "children," or "lineal descendants," will contend that the
doctrine does not apply to their clients. Attorneys for natural children,
if an adopted child is attempting to compel them to account for
advancements, will contend that he cannot compel them to account.
In two cases, courts have pointed out that a voluntary inter vivas
transfer from a parent to an adopted child is an advancement.148
Those cases did not involve the doctrine in its strict sense, but were
cases in which the court was called upon to determine whether the
transaction was a gift or resulting trust.
146 22 and 23 Charles II,
147 N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann.

c. IO (1670).
(1943) §29-1(2); Cf. Davis v. Duke, 3 N.C. 224 (1802);
Haskins, "The Beginnings of Partible Inheritance in the American Colonies," 51 YALE
L.J. 1280 (1942); Cf. Batton v. Allen, 5 N.J. Eq. (I Halst.) 99 (1845). The courts will
not allow children to agree that a sum received from one of their parents is an advancement. Woodward v. Little, 4 Ky. L. Rep. 990 (1883); Fitts v. Morse, 103 Mass. 164
(1869). However, in Farnsworth v. Dinsmore, 32 Tenn. (2 Swan) 38 (1852), such an
agreement which was supported by valuable consideration was held to be enforceable in
equity. See also, Hoerle v. Hoerle, 94 App. Div. 615, 87 N.Y.S. 1007 (1904). If a parent
joins in a deed because of homestead or dower rights, the value of the property cannot be
charged to the child as an advancement on the distribution of his or her estate. Coward
v. Hamblen, 21 Tenn. App. 239, 108 S.W. (2d) 885 (1937); cf. Cain v. Cain, 53 S.C.
350, 31 S.E. 278 (1898). In that case an intestate transferred property worth $1600 to
one of his children. His wife furnished $600 of the purchase money. Held, that the transaction was an advancement to the extent of $1000. See also, Shaw v. Shaw, 25 Tenn. (6
Humph.) 418 (1846). In several cases, a son requested a parent to make a gift to his child
or some third person. On the parent's death intestate the court held that the value of the
property was an advancement to the son. Weddle v. Waddle's Admr., 261 Ky. 208, 87
S.W. (2d) 383 (1935); Hamilton v. Moore, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 982, 70 S.W. 402 (1902);
Gordon v. Barkelew, 6 N.J. Eq. (2 Halst.) 94 (1847); Zerega v. Zerega, 78 Misc. 466,
138 N.Y.S. 580 (1912). That rule is subject to the limitation that the child's request must
be made prior to the transfer. McClellan v. Sharp's Admr., 11 Ky. Law Rep. 525 (1889).
148 Currant v. Jago, 1 Coll. 260, 63 Eng. Rep. 410 (1844); Astreen v. Flanagan, 3
Edw. Ch. (N.Y.) 279 (1839).
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In jurisdictions which hold that an adopted child is an heir of the
adopting parent, the courts would undoubtedly hold that the word
"heir" as used in the advancement statute includes an adopted child.149
Since the courts uniformly hold that an adopted child is entitled to full
rights of inheritance,150 they would, by analogy, apply the advancement legislation to an adopted child if the statute of descents used the
·
words "ch·ld
1 ren, " "·issue," or "descendants. " Any oth er conelus1on
would lead to inequality in the distribution of a parent's estate. If an
adopted child is entitled to inherit the same share as a natural child, he
must be included within the statute.

D. Grandparent and Grandchild

In jurisdictions which use the terms "lineal descendants," "descendants," "grandchildren," and "heirs" in their advancement statutes, a
voluntary inter vivos transfer of property from a grandparent to a grandchild is an advancement. Other states do not solve the problem by
express legislative enactment, and the court must ascertain whether the
words "child" or "children" include grandchildren. All cases involving this problem hold that they do. 151 The courts recognized that such
decisions were judicial legislation and that they were extending by construction the word "child" to include "grandchild." However, they felt
that to hold otherwise would defeat the intent and design of the statute
to equalize the division of the intestate's property among his children.
In Eshelman's Appeal,1 52 the Pennsylvania court indicated that the
word "child" included the word "grandchild" only when he inherited
by right of representation. But in Storey' s Appeal153 that court held
that a grandchild who inherits as next of kin must account for advancements.
. This rule is subject to the limitation that the grandchild must be
ap. heir apparent of the grandparent at the time of the transaction. If
149 Brock v. Dorman, 339 Mo. 611, 98 S.W. (2d) 672 (1936); Oler, "Construction of
Private Instruments Where Adopted Children Are Concerned," 43 MrcH. L. REv. 705,
901 (1945).
150 Sanders v. Taylor, 193 Ark. 1095, 104 S.W. (2d) 797 (1937); In re Moore's
Estate, 7 Cal. App. (2d) 722, 47 P. (2d) 533 (1935); Bray v. Miles, 23 Ind. App. 432,
54 N.E. 446 (1899); O'Connel v. Powers, 291 Mass. 153, 197 N.E. 162 (1935); Brock
v. Dorman, 339 Mo. 611, 98 S.W. (2d) 672 (1936); In re Cupples' Estate, 272 Mo. 465,
199 S.W. 556 (1917); Batchelder v. Walworth, 85 Vt. 323, 82 A. 7 (1912).
151 Wolfe v. Galloway, 211 N.C. 361, 190 S.E. 213 (1937); Storey's Appeal, 83 Pa.
89 (1877); Eshelman's Appeal, 1 Leg. Chron. 245 (Pa. 1873).
152 1 Leg. Chron. 245 (Pa. 1873).
153 83 Pa. 89 (1877).
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he is not an heir because his father is living, the transfer is an absolute
gift, and does not become an advancement because his father predeceases his grandfather.154

E. Husband and Wife
Many times a father makes advancements to his children and on
the settlement of his estate his widow claims that the children must
account to her for advancements. Some states have solved the problem
by legislative enactment. The majority of them provide that she is not
entitled to take advantage of advancements.155 However, two of them
provide that she can compel her children to account.156
In most states where the problem is not covered by statute, the courts
hold that a widow cannot compel her children to account for advancements.157 The reasons for the rule are that the purpose of the statute is
to preserve equality among the intestate's children,1 58 that in England a
surviving spouse is not entitled to the benefit of the doctrine and most
of our statutes are patterned after statutes in that country,159 that a
widow cannot be compelled to account for advancements and consequently she is not entitled to the benefit of them,160 that the rights
of inheritance of a widow and her children are not identical161
154 Stevenson v. Martin, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 485 (1875); Headen v. Headen, 42 N.C.
(7 Ired. Eq.) 159 (1850); Chadwell v. Chadwell, 9 Tenn. App. 181 (1927).
155 Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 16, §11; Del. Rev. Code (1935) §3752; D.C. Code
(1940) §18-108; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) §391.140; Md. Gen. Laws (1939) art. 93, §133;
Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 196, §3.
156 Ga. Code Ann. (Parks 1937) §113-1016; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1943) §28-130.
l57 May v. May, 15 Ala. 177 (1849); Porter v. Collins, 7 Conn. 1 (1828). In that
case advancements were charged to the children by will. Beaver's v. Winn, 9 Ga. 189
(1833). The Georgia statute was amended to nullify this decision. See note 156 supra.
Ruch Admr. v. Biery, 110 Ind. 444, 11 N.E. 312 (1887); Talbott's Exr. v. Goetz, 286
Ky. 504, 151 S.W. (2d) 369 (1941); Murray v. Murray, 90 Ky. 1, 13 S.W. 244 (1890).
That case indicates that a surviving spouse might complain if the advancements to the
children are unreasonable. Steams v. Stearns, 18 Mass. (I Pick.)157 (1822); Whitley
v. Stephenson, 38 Miss. 113 (1855); Schaper's Exr. v. Schaper, 158 Mo. App. 605, 138
S.W. 896 (1911); In re Denison's Estate, 157 Misc. 385, 284 N.Y.S. 705 (1935);
Cochran v. Garth, 163 Tenn. 59, 40 S.W. (2d) 1023. In that case advancements were
charged by will. Rowe v. Rowe, 144 Va. 816, 130 S.E. 771 (1926); Contra: Page v.
Elwell, 81 Colo. 73, 253 P. 1059 (1927); Klein v. Blackshere, 113 Kan. 539, 215 P. 315
(1923); Davis v. Duke, Con. and N. 361 (I N.C.) (1801). That result was reached
because in North Carolina a widow receives a child's share of her husband's estate. The
North Carolina statute is now in accord with this case. Note 156 supra.
15BMay v. May, 15 Ala. 177 (1849); Rowe v. Rowe, 144 Va. 816, 130 S.E. 771
(1926).
159 Appeal of Miller, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 355 (1847).
160 Beaver's v. Winn, 9 Ga. 189 (1833); Schaper's Exr. v. Schaper, 150 Mo. App.
605, 138
896 (1911).
161 Brunson v. Brunson, Meigs 630 (19 Tenn.) (1838).
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(although the result is the same in jurisdictions where a widow is entitled to a child's share),162 and that she is entitled to share only in the
estate of which her husband died possessed.163 The real justification
for the rule is that in those jurisdictions the statute uses the words
"child," "child or lineal descendant," and "child or grandchild" and
under no circumstance can such terms be said to include a surviving
spouse.
In jurisdictions where the statute makes the doctrine applicable to
"any person," or "heirs," a widow can compel her children to account
for advancements.164 Conversely, if the surviving spouse received an
advancement from her husband she can be compelled to account for
its value on the distribution of his estate.165
The Colorado statute reads: "Where any of the children of the
intestate shall have received in his lifetime any real or personal estate
by way of advancement, and the other heirs desire it to be charged to
him...." 166 The Colorado court, in construing this statute, held that
the surviving spouse can compel children to account for advancements.167 That court, because of the wording of the statute, has indicated by way of dictum that the children cannot compel the widow to
account for advancements.
Courts that would compel a widow to account recognize a different
presumption where a child is seeking to compel a survivjng spouse to
account.168 In the case of a child, the presumption is in favor of an
advancement, while in the case of a widow, the presumption is in favor
of an absolute gift.169 On principle, the view adhered to by these
courts is sound. Since the legislative enactment is sufficiently comprehensive to include a wife and the cases indicate that they would
162May v. May, 15 Ala. 177 (1849); Beavor's v. Winn, 9 Ga. 189 (1833); Schaper's
Exr. v. Schaper, 150 Mo. App. 605, 138 S.W. 896 (1911). Contra, Davis v. Duke, Con.
and N. 361 (I N.C.) (1801) .
163 May v. May, 15 Ala. 177 (1849); Porter v. Collins, 7 Conn. 1 (1828); Beavor's
v. Winn, 9 Ga. 189 (1833); Steams v. Steams, 18 Mass. (I Pick.) 157 (1822); Whitley
v. Stephenson, 38 Miss. 113 (1855).
164 Page v. Elwell, 81 Colo. 73, 253 P. 1059 (1927); Klein v. Blackshere, 113 Kan.
539, 215 P. 315 (1923). Cf. In re Dodge's Estate, 9 Cal. App. (2d) 650, 50 P. (2d)
839 (1935); In re Kennedy's Estate, 154 Iowa 460, 135 N.W. 53 (1912); Davis v. Duke,
Con. and N. 361 (I N.C.) (1801).
165 Klein v. Blackshere, 113 Kan. 539, 215 P. 315 (1923); In re Dodge's Estate, 9
Cal. App. (2d) 650, 50 P. (2d) 839 (1935).
166 Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 176, §5.
167 Page v. Elwell, 81 Colo. 73, 253 P. 315 (1923).
168 Cf. Page v. Elwell, supra note 167.
169 Klein v. Blackshere, 113 Kan. 539, 215 P. 315 (1923).
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require her to account, the use of a different presumption seems correct because the purpose of the doctrine is to preserve equality among
the children.
In numerous cases where the husband is trying to show that a transfer of property to his wife was intended as a resulting trust, the courts
state that the transaction is presumed to be an advancement. When a
widow is seeking to compel children to account for advancements, these
same courts hold that the doctrine is inapplicable.17° For the sake of
clarity, courts should drop the use of the word "advancement" in cases
involving the right of a husband to recover property he has conveyed
to his wife.

F. Collaterals
In states where the advancement statutes apply to "child," "lineal
descendant," "child or grandchild," "child or lineal descendant," and
"children and their issue," the courts refuse to extend such words to
include collaterals and a voluntary transfer of property by a person to
a collateral relative is not an advancement.171
In Waldron 11. Taylor,1 72 the West Virginia court held that the
word "descendant" as used in advancement legislation did not require
collateral relatives to account for advancements. The legislature did
not agree with that decision and amended the statute to annul its
effect.173
In jurisdictions where the statute makes the doctrine applicable to
"any person" or "heirs," collaterals can be compelled to account for
advancements.174 In Corlett 11. May,1 75 the Florida court pointed out
that the rule is subject to the following exception:
"It must necessarily follow, however, that before a transaction
may be held to constitute an advancement, it must be shown that
170 Botkin v. Pyle, 91 Colo. 221, 14 P. (2d) 187 (1932); Johnson v. Foust, 158 Iowa
195, 139 N.W. 451 (1913); Smith v. Smith, 215 Mich. 556, 184 N.W. 501 (1921);
Wilson v. Beauchamp, 49 Miss. 556 (1870); Herbert v. Alvord, 75 N.J. Eq. 428, 72 A.
946 (1909); Oldham v. Oldham, 58 R.I. 268, 192 A. 758 (1937).
171 Johnson v. Antriken, 205 Mo. 244, 103 S.W. 936 (1907); In re Farmer's Loan
and Trust Co., 99 Misc. 420, 163 N.Y.S. 961 (1917), reversed 181 App. Div. 642, 168
N.Y.S. 952 (1918), affirmed 225 N.Y. 666, 122 N.E. 880 (19.19). Cf. In re Fleming's
Estate, 173 Misc. 851, 19 N.Y.S. (2d) 234 (1940); Corlett v. May, 126 Fla. 506, 171 S.
517 (1936).
172 52 W.Va. 284, 45 S.E. 336 (1902).
173 W.Va. Code Ann. (1949) §4094.
174 Corlett v. May, 126 Fla. 506, 171 S. 517 (1936); Dicta, In re Rawnsley's Estate,
(Cal. App. 1949) 210 P. (2d) 888.
175 Corlett v. May, 126 Fla. 506, 171 S. 517 (1936).
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at the time of the transaction the existing conditions were such
that if continued until the death of the donor, the donee would be
entitled to participate in the inheritance of the estate of the
donor...."

G. Persons Who Should Be Included in Advancement Statutes
The primary concern of our discussion thus far has been to
determine what persons are included in the advancement statutes.
Since statutes are based on desired social policies, the present objective
is to determine the persons who should be covered by such legislation. If a doctrine of advancements is essential to our law, it must
apply to voluntary inter vivos transfers from a parent to a child. The
authors of the Model Probate Code- take the position that the doctrine
should apply to all persons " . . . who, if the intestate had died at the
time of making the advancement, would be entitled to inherit a part of
his estate."176 Such a rule would include grandchildren, collateral
relatives and a surviving spouse.

I. Grandchildren. Very few cases involve an advancement by a
grandparent to a grandchild. One of the reasons for this is the requirement that the advancee be an heir of the advancor at the time of the
transaction. A grandparent ordinarily predeceases his son, and consequently his grandchild is not an heir and cannot be charged with
advancements. However, on a few occasions a child dies before his
parent and grandchildren are charged with advancements made to
them. A grandparent may feel that he is a father to a grandchild whose
father is dead. If he is not established in life, the grandparent is likely
to transfer money or property to him for that purpose. For that reason,
a grandchild should be included in advancement statutes.
2.
Collaterals. On only three occasions have appellate courts
been required to determine whether the doctrine of advancements
applies to collaterals.177 The result of these cases has always depended
on the legislative enactment of the jurisdiction where the problem
BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW 65 (1946).
v. May, 126 Fla. 506, 171 S. 517 (1936); Johnson v. Antriken, 205 Mo.
244, 103 S.W. 936 (1907); Waldon v. Taylor, 52 W.Va. 284, 45 S.E. 336 (1902). See
also, In re Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., supra note 171; In re Fleming's Estate, 173 Misc.
851, 19 N.Y.S. (2d) 234 (1940).
176 SIMES Al\"'D
177 Corlett
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arose. Seven state statutes178 and the Model Probate Code1 79 are comprehensive enough to include collaterals. The problem may have been
presented to probate and other courts, and attorneys may have advised
clients after consulting the statute that collaterals need not account for
advancements or that they must account for advancements. Since
courts have not been called upon to pass on these problems often, we
may infer that advancements are seldom made to collaterals.
A person may not have the same degree of affection for each of his
collateral relatives. He may be much closer to one brother or sister
than the rest of his brothers and sisters. On only very few occasions
would a person make a gift to a collateral relative with a view towards
his establishment in life. Also, a collateral relative may be entitled
to inherit a share of the transferor's estate at the time of the transfer,
but that right may be cut off by the transferor's marriage. Likewise,
he may not be entitled to inherit at the time of the transfer, but death
in the transferor's family may make him an heir. 180
For those reasons, the doctrine of advancements should not include
collaterals. If a person desires to charge a gift to a collateral relative as
an advancement, he may do so by will or by use of the release of expectancy doctrine.

3. Husband and Wife. Earlier, the right of a widow to participate in advancements was discussed. At that time it was observed that
in all reported cases, with one exception, the surviving spouse was
attempting to compel the children to account for advancements. There
are approximately thirty-five cases in which this problem has been
presented to the courts. Although one might feel that there are not
enough decisions to give consideration to the problem, logical reasoning shows that in every case when a wife survives a husband who has
made advancements to their children, the possibility of applying the
doctrine arises. The problem then becomes so important that social
policy dictates a conclusion one way or another.
A widow's share in her husband's estate may be diminished by not
permitting her to take advantage of advancements. If he makes large
178 Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) §1051; Fla. Stat. (1941) §734.07; Laws of
Kansas (1939) c. 180, §32, p. 308; Iowa Code (1946) §636.44; N.H. Rev. Laws (1942)
c. 360, §13; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1949) tit. 20, §1.9; W.Va. Code Ann. (1949) 4094
(expressly covers collaterals).
179 SIMES AND BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATB LAW 67 (1946).
180 Corlett v. May, 128 Fla. 506, 171 S. 517 (1936).
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advancements, her distributive share of his estate may be very small. If
she can compel the children to account for advancements, her share
would be increased. In the case of a large estate the failure of the law
to allow a widow to take advantage of advancements may not be
serious. If the estate is small, a widow may suffer irreparable injury
because she cqnnot compel the children to account.
Seldom does a husband make a gift to his wife that he considers an
advanc~ment. His reasons are (I) that they are approximately the
same age and there is no presumption that one will live longer than the
other and (2) that since a wife is usually content to perform household
duties rather than engage in business, she rarely needs substantial sums
of money.
Those reasons are sufficient to justify a statute that does not make
the doctrine of advancements applicable to a widow. In addition, the
intestacy laws of most states are not designed to preserve equality
between a widow and her children. In most states she is entitled to
more than a child's share. Consequently, the reason for the advancement doctrine is not applicable to a widow.
Undoubtedly, any solution to the problem will work some hardships in isolated cases. However, the rule which holds that the
doctrine is not applicable to the widow is based on a more logical public
policy. Such a rule is one of reasonable expectations. A husband,
when he makes advancements to his children, is charged with the
knowledge that the doctrine does not apply to his wife. Consequently,
if he desires to allow her to take advantage of advancements or if he
desires to compel her to account for advancements, he must make a will
containing such a provision.181

V
PROPERTY SuBJECT TO AnvANCEMENT

A. Real and Personal Property
An advancement may consist of real or personal property or both.
At the time the statute of distributions was enacted in England, the law
of primogeniture was in full force and effect and the eldest son did not
have to account for advancements in real estate. However, the other
children had to account for all advancements received by them includ181 If a person elects to draw a will to allow his wife to take advantage of the advancement concept, he must specifically provide that the accounting required of the children
is for her benefit.
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ing both real and personal property.182 North Carolina followed that
rule at one time.183 In the great majority of states, the statute
specifically covers both real and personal property.184 In Ohio, prior
to amendment of the statute, a child had to account for advancements
in real estate but not in personal property.185
The legislative enactments of Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas and
Maryland do not specifically state the types of property subject to
advancement. The Iowa and Kansas statutes use the word "property."186 The Georgia legislation reads as follows: "An advancement
is any provision made by a parent out of his estate ... either in money
or property...."187 The Florida act reads: " ... where any person has
received an advancement ..."188 and the Maryland statute states: "...
shall have been advanced by the intestate by settlement or portion
...."189 In West 11. Beck,190 the Iowa court held that the word "property" included both real and personal property. The Kansas, Georgia
182 22 and 23 Charles II, c. 10 (1670).
183 Jones v. Jones, 2 Murph. 150 (N.C. '1812). See also, Teny v. Dayton, 31 Barb.
519 (N.Y. 1860).
184AJa. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 16, §14; Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §39-107; Ark. Stat.
Ann. (1947) tit. 61, §116; Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) §1051; Colo. Stat. Ann.
(1935) c. 176, §5; Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. (1949) §7058; Del. Rev. Code (1935) §3752,
§3851; D.C. Code (1940) §§18-108, 18-707; Idaho Code Ann. (1932) §14-107; ill. Ann.
Stat. (1947) c. 3, §166; Ind. Ann. Stat. (Bums, 1933) §6-1503; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948)
§391.140; Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 156, §4; Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 196, §3; Mich.
Stat. Ann. (1937) §27.3178 (157); Minn. Stat. Ann. (1946) §525.531; Miss. Code Ann.
(1942) §475; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1939) §311; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §91-412; Neb.
Rev. Stat. (1943) §30-112; Nev. Comp. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1941) §9882-301; N.H. Rev.
Laws (1942) c. 360, §16, c. 360, §15; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §3:5-2, §3:3-3; N.Y. Decedent's Estate Law §85; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1943) §29-1(2); N.D. Rev. Code (1943)
§30-2112; Ohio Code Ann. (Baldwin, 1940) §10503-19; Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 84, §223;
Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §16-301; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1949) tit. 20, §1.9;
R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 567, §22; S.D. Code Ann. (1939) §56.0114; Tenn. Code Ann.
(Michie, 1938) §8402a; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1948) art. 2576; Utah Code Ann.
(1943) §101-4-18; Vt. Stat (1947) §3066; Va. Code Ann. (1950) §64-17; Wash. Rev.
Stat. Ann. (1932) §1348; W.Va. Code Ann. (1949) §4094; Wis. Stat. (1947) §318.24;
Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945) §6-2505. Cf. S.C. Code Ann. (1942) §8909. The legislation of South Carolina does not say what types of property are covered by the doctrine
but in discussing the valuation of advancements the statute reads as follows: " .•• but so
as neither the improvements of the real estate by such child or children, nor the increase
of the personal property, shall be taken into the computation. • • ." This language indicates that the statute was intended to cover both types. In addition, cases have been decided
in that state which apply the doctrine to both kinds without questioning whether they
are covered. Cain v. Cain, 53 S.C. 350, 31 S.E. 278, 69 Am. St. Rep. 863 (1898); Carter
v. King, 11 Rich. Law 125 (S.C. 1857).
1s;; Needles v. Needles, 7 Ohio St. 432 (1857); Putnam's Admr. v. Heirs of Putnam,
18 Ohio 347 (1849).
186 Iowa Code (1946) §636.44; Laws of Kansas (1939) c. 180, §32, p. 308.
187 Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1937) §113-1013.
188 Fla. Stat. (1941) §734.07.
180 Md. Ann. Code (1939) art. 93, §133.
190 95 Iowa 520, 64 N.W. 599 (1895).
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and Maryland courts, without discussing the problem, have charged
both types of property as an advancement.191 This ruling was necessary to the decision of the court, and the cases are strong if not conclusive authority for assuming that the statute in those states includes
both real and personal property.192 The Florida legislation is part of a
new probate code and the courts of that state have never been called
upon to construe it. Prior to the passage of the new law the statute
expressly applied to both real and personal property.193
In addition, the intestate laws of all these states include both real
and personal property.194 Courts uniformly hold that the purpose of
the advancement statutes is to preserve equality among children.195
Using that reason, it seems that the courts of these states, if called on to
pass on what types of property are covered by the statute, would hold
both to be included. To hold otherwise would tend to defeat the very
equality that the statute was enacted to preserve.

B. Promissory Notes
If a parent gives a child a promissory note or other form of written
obligation and the parent dies, he may seek to collect from the estate
and allow the administrator to charge him with an advancement. One
might well say this is not material since the estate could not lose and the
child could not gain by the transaction. Yet, if the note is for more
than the child's distributive share, the advancement provision would
not equalize the amount he could recover from the personal representative.196 The solution of this problem turns on whether the instrument
is under seal. If it is, the administrator cannot show lack of consideration; but if it is not, he can show a failure of consideration and the child
cannot recover.197
191 Bowen v. Holland, 184 Ga. 718, 193 S.E. 233 (1937); Barron v. Barron, 181 Ga.
505, 182 S.E. 851 (1935); Cutliff v. Boyd, 72 Ga. 302 (1884); Klein v. Blackshere, 113
Kan. 539, 215 P. 315 (1923); Bums v. Bums, 87 Kan. 19, 123 P. 720 (1912); Johnson
v. Eaton, 51 Kan. 708, 33 P. 597 (1893); Graves v. Spedden, 46 Md. 527 (1877); Clark
v. Wilson, 27 Md. 693 (1867); State v. Jameson, 3 Gil. and J. (Md.) 442 (1831).
192 Oliphant, "A Return to Stare Decisis," 6 AM. L. ScHOOL RBv. 215 (1927).
193 Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws (1927) §5489.
194 Md. Ann. Code (1939) art. 46, §1.
195Bash v. Bash, 182 Iowa 55, 165 N.W. 399 (1917).
196 Part XII-E infra. [To be published subsequently.-Ed.]
197 Sullivan v. Sullivan, 122 Ky. 707, 92 S.W. 966 (1906); Shotwell's Admr. v.
Struble, 21 N.J. Eq. (6 C. E. Green) 31 (1870); BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 171
(1936).
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C. Life Insurance Policies
A parent may take out a life insurance policy on his life and name
one of his children beneficiary. On his death intestate, the other children may claim that the proceeds of the insurance should be charged
to the child as an advancement. In several cases courts have charged
the value of life insurance policies as advancements.198 In Thompson
v. Latimer,1 99 a child claimed that the proceeds of a life insurance
policy were not an advancement because the insured reserved the right
to change the beneficiary. The Kentucky court rejected that argument
and charged the child with an· advancement. In Kentucky, the intent
of the advancor is immaterial and all substantial voluntary inter vivos
transfers are advancements. Also, the doctrine of advancements applies
to cases of partial intestacy. In that state an insurance policy is treated
as a testamentary disposition of property. These factors make the
Kentucky decision sound. Any other result would be a method of permitting a person to defeat the purpose of the advancement legislation
without observing the statutory requisites.
Other states do not apply the doctrine to the cases of partial intestacy and the intent of the intestate governs. 200 Therefore, the reasoning of the Kentucky court is not applicable. In those states, the courts,
by way of dicta, assert that advancements must be made in the lifetime
of the advancor. 201 Lawyers using these statements as a basis might
argue that an insurance policy in which the insured reserves the right
to change the beneficiary is not an advancement. Such a contention
should be, and is, overruled. A settlor can create a trust and reserve
the power to revoke. If he dies without revoking the trust, the beneficiary, if he is a party to whom the doctrine of advancements applies,
must account for the property on the distribution of the settlor's
198 Culberhouse v. Culberhouse, 68 Ark. 405, 68 S.W. 38 (1900); Thompson v.
Latimer, 209 Ky. 491, 273 S.W. 65 (1925); Rickenbacker v. Zimmerman, 10 S.C. 110
(1877) (right to change beneficiary not reserved); Cazassa v. Cazassa, 92 Tenn. 573, 22
S.W. 560 (1893); cf. Paschal v. Paschal, 197 N.C. 40, 147 S.E. 680 (1929). In that
case a mother paid some of the insurance premiums on her son's life. She predeceased him
and the other heirs sought to charge the money so expended by her to him as an advancement. The son had paid some of the premiums and the policy was payable to the mother
if he predeceased her. Held, that it was a joint adventure rather than an advancement.
199 209 Ky. 491, 273 S.W. 65 (1925). Cf. Justice v. Mead, 220 Ky. 638, 295 S.W.
976 (1927).
200 Part VI-A and D(l) infra. [To be published subsequently.-Ed.]
201 Grattan v. Grattan, 18 Ill. (8 Peck.) 167 (1856); In re Harrison's Estate, 298 Pa.
514, 148 A. 704 (1930).
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estate.202 By analogy, an insurance policy in which the insured
reserves the right to change the beneficiary is an advancement. The
purpose of the statute is to preserve equality among the intestate's children, and to hold that an insurance policy cannot be an advancement
would tend to produce inequality.

D. Vested and Contingent Remainders
A vested remainder is an advancement because it is a present and
fixed interest in property even though the possession and enjoyment
are in the future. 203 The types of vested remainders that have been
charged as advancements are (I) where the advancor reserves a life
estate and (2) where the advancor creates a life estate in a third person
and provides that property on the life tenant's death shall vest in one
of the advancor's children or some other person to whom the doctrine
of advancements would be applicable.204
If a parent conveys property to his son for life with remainder to
some third person, the son, on his father's death intestate, would undoubtedly contend that he should not be charged with the value of the
life estate as an advancement. In support of that contention, he would
have no cases squarely in point. However, he would have cases which
hold that where a parent places a child in possession of land and permits the latter to occupy it for several years without paying rent, the
rental value of the land is not an advancement.205 In all probability,
the courts would hold that these cases are not in point and do not support the son's contention. The basis of those decisions is that the
occupancy is permissive and precarious and given as an accommodation
rather than an advancement. Those reasons would not be applicable
where the child has a vested life interest in the land, and consequently
the courts would probably hold that this life interest was given for the
establishment of the child in life and is prima facie an advancement.
In England, since enactment of the Administration of Estates Act of
1925, a life estate is prima facie an advancement.206
202 Hughey v. Eichelberger, 11 S.C. 36
203 Wilks' Admr. v. Greer, 14 Ala. 437

(1878).
(1848); Gossage v. Gossage's Aclmr., 281 Ky.
575, 136 S.W. (2d) 775 (1940); Hook v. Hook, 52 Ky. (13 B. Mon.) 526 (1852); Clark
v. Wilson, 27 Md. 693 (1867); State v. Jameson, 3 Gil. & J. (Md.) 442 (1831); Palmer v.
Culbertson, 65 Hun. 625, 20 N.Y.S. 391 (1892) affirmed 143 N.Y. 213, 38 N.E. 199
(1894); Hughey v. Eichelberger, 11 S.C. 36 (1878).
204 See note 203 supra.
205 See note 209 infra.
206 15 Geo. V, c. 23, §471 (iii) (1925).
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A contingent remainder has been held to be an advancement. In
Edwards v. Freeman,207 a husband, by marriage settlement, secured a
portion for the daughters of his marriage, if he died intestate without
male issue. The indenture provided that his daughter or daughters
should receive the funds at the age of eighteen, or upon marriage. His
wife died and he remarried. On his death intestate, he left a daughter
by his first marriage and a son and daughter by his second wife. The
provisions of the marriage settlement applied only to the children of his
first marriage. At the time of his death, the daughter of the first
marriage was not yet eighteen years old and had not married. The
court held that the amount to be taken by the daughter was an advancement. The court pointed out that where the remainder is contingent,
it must be limited to take effect within a reasonable time and if not so
limited it cannot be charged as an advancement.

E. Powers of Appointment
In Minnesota, New York and Tennessee,208 where a power in trust
is granted to a parent to bestow property conveyed or settled by the
instrument creating the power or trust, in favor of one or more of the
children of such parent~ any property given under such power or trust
to a child is presumed to be an advancement.

F. Use of Land as an Advancement
A parent may place a child in possession of land and permit him to
occupy the land for a number of years without paying rent. On the
parent's death intestate, the other children may attempt to compel the
child to account for the rental value of the land as an advancement.
Under such circumstances, the courts generally hold that the rental
value of the land is not an advancement. 209 The reason for the rule
207 2 P. Wms. 435, 24 Eng. Rep. 803 (I 727). Cf. In re Jones' Estate, 29 Pitts. Leg.
J. 89 (1881). In that case a parent executed a declaration of trust under the terms of
which the income was to be used to support and educate his daughter's son. When the
son became of age the principal was to vest in the daughter. On her father's death it was
contended that this was an advancement to her. She died before his estate was closed and
the son had not become of age. Held, that the presumption is one of gift.
208 Minn. Stat. Ann. (1946) §502.74 N.Y. Decedent's Estate Law §85; Tenn. Code
Ann. (Michie, 1938) §8404.
209Wilson v. Kelly, 21 S.C. 535 (1884). In that case a father prior to the Emancipation Proclamation gave slaves to some of his children. He died subsequent to the proclamation. In that state, advancements are valued as of the day the advancor died. Other
children claimed that the reasonable rental value of the slaves was an advancement. Held,
that the rental value was not chargeable as an advancement. Ison v. Ison, 5 Rich Eq. (S.C.)
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is that the occupancy is permissive and precarious and given as an
accommodation rather than an advancement made toward the permanent establishment of the child in life.210 However, in Robinson
Admr. 11. Rohinson,211 a father placed a son in possession of land,
reserving title in himself for the purpose of keeping the land from being
sacrificed for the debts the son might create. The Tennessee court
ruled that the rental value was an advancement to the son. That case
seems o:ut of line with the cases decided in other jurisdictions. The
only explanation is that the father, because of the son's spendthrift
nature, gave him the use of the land with the intent to charge it as an
advancement.
In Kentucky, because of the peculiar feature of the advancement
statute, the reasonable rental value of land is ordinarily charged as an
advancement. The reason for the Kentucky rule is that to hold otherwise would be to defeat the equality designed to be effected by the
statute. However, the rental value of land is not always an advancement.212 If a parent places a child in possession of land and at the
same time promises to give it to him but does not execute a deed until
years later, the use of the land from the time of taking possession until
the time of conveyance is not an advancement.213 If a child makes
improvements on the land or works on it in such a way as to increase
its value, the Kentucky court holds that the improvements are sufficient
to offset any claim that the reasonable rental value of the land is an
advancement. 214
·
215
In Ford 11. Thompson-, a father put his two sons in possession of
his farm under an arrangement that they were to have all they made
after supporting the family and paying the necessary expenses of the
15 (1852); Christian v. Coleman's Admr., 3 Leigh 30 (Va. 1831); Williams v. Stonestreet, 3 Rand 559 (Va. 1825); Contra, Mason and Holman v. Holman, 78 Tenn. (IO Lea.)
315 (1882).
210 Ison v. Ison, 5 Rich. Eq. (S.C.) 15 (1852); Christian v. Coleman's Admr., 3 Leigh
30 (Va. 1831).
21123 Tenn. (4 Humph.) 392 (1843).
212 Cochran v. Simmons, 211 Ky. 16, 276 S.W. 989 (1925); McCray v. Com, 168
Ky. 457, 182 S.W. 640 (1916); Boblett v. Barlow, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 1076, 83 S.W. 145
(1904); Garrett v. Rives, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 2165, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 10, 80 S.W. 519
(1904); Hamilton v. Moore, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 982, 70 S.W. 402 (1902).
213 Ward v. Johnson, 124 Ky. 1, 97 S.W. 1110 (1906); Bowles v. Winchester, 76
Ky. (13 Bush) 1 (1877).214 Cochran v. Simmons, 211 Ky. 16, 276 S.W. 989 (1925); McCray v. Com, 168
Ky. 457, 182 S.W. 640 (1916); Clarke v. Clarke, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) (1857).
215 58 Ky. (I Mete.) 580 (1859).
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farm. The Kentucky court held that they must account for the balance
of the profits accruing from the property after deducting the reasonable expenses of supporting the family. The decision of the court in
that case is erroneous in that the arrangement between the parties was
a contract rather than an advancement. This distinction was, however, rejected by the court in that case. Under the ruling of the court
the advancees were deprived of the profit of their labor. All they
received for their years of toil was support and maintenance. The
proper method of valuation should be the reasonable rental value of the
land less the amount expended for the support of the family.

G. Parol Gi~ Land
A parent may give land to a child but fail to give him a deed. On
the farmer's death, a dispute may arise as to whether the land is part
of the parent's estate or whether, if he died intestate, it is an advancement to the child. Of course, the other heirs would, if the land were
valuable, claim that it was not an advancement because of the lack of
a writing as required by the statute of frauds. If the parent gives the
land to the child and the latter enters into possession and makes valuable improvements, the cases hold that the land is an advancement to
the child and that the making of improvements is sufficient to take the
transaction out of the statute of frauds. 216
Without the donee making valuable improvements, a parol gift of
land is insufficient to take the transaction out of the statute of frauds.
Under such circumstances the land, on the death of the donor, is treated as a part of his estate rather than as an advancement to the child.217
In Tennessee and South Carolina, when a parent makes a parol gift
of land to a child and the latter enters into possession and makes valuable improvements and remains in possession for the time required to
perfect a title by adverse possession, the courts hold that the child
acquires a possessory right and that he must, on the settlement of the
216 McMahill v. McMahill, 69 Iowa 115, 28 N.W. 470 (1886); Ford v. Ellingwood,
60 Ky. (3 Mete.) 359 (1860); Butler v. Lollar, (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) 199 S.W. 1176;
Nicholas v. Nicholas, 100 Va. 660, 42 S.E. 669 (1902); cf. Williams v. Stonestreet, 3
Rand. (Va.) 559 (1825).
217 Cf. Dugan v. Gittings, 3 Gill. (Md.) 138 (1845). In that case a father, on his
daughter's marriage, gave her a home but did not give her a deed. She predeceased her
father and her heirs claimed that the property descended to them. Her father's heirs claimed
that the gift was within the statute of frauds. Held, the marriage was sufficient consideration to take the transaction out of the statute.
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parent's estate, account for the value of the land as an advancement. 218
In Joyce v. Hamilton, 219 a daughter sued to quiet title to land on the
theory that her father placed her in possession with the intention that
she should reside on the land as long as he lived; that on his death she
should take life estate; that on her death the property should descend to
her children. The evidence showed that she entered into possession
and made valuable improvements and that subsequently he deeded the
land to defendants, his other children. The Supreme Court of Indiana
ruled that the land belonged to defendants for the reason that the father
did not sufficiently divest himself of the title to the property. The only
way that case can be distinguished from the rule that a parol gift of
land, plus the making of valuable improvements, is sufficient to perfect
title 'in the advancee, is on the theory that the ancestor had never
expressly given the land to his daughter but merely planned to give it
to her in the future.
[To be continued]
218 Hamer v. Hamer, 4 Stroh. Eq. (S.C.) 124 (1850); Keys v. Keys, 58 Tenn. (I 1
Heisk.) 425 (1872); O'Neal v. Breecheen, 64 Tenn. (5 Eruct.) 604 (1875); Haynes v.
Jones, 39 Tenn. (2 Head) 372 (1872). Cf. Yancy v. Yancy, 52 Tenn. (5 Heisk.) 353,
13 Am. Rep. 5 (1852).
210111 Ind. 163, 12 N.E. 294 (1887).

